Software-based switch for providing products and/or services to users without compromising their privacy

ABSTRACT

An online service provisioning process is provided during which the service provider&#39;s knowledge about the user to whom the service is delivered does not increase. This is accomplished by presenting user attribute information to the service provider as obfuscated objects that can be independently verified and which are privacy preserving.

CROSS-REFERENCE

This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 15/671,021, filed Aug. 7, 2017 and claims the benefit ofProvisional Application Ser. No. 62/385,515, filed Sep. 9, 2016, thecontents of both applications being incorporated herein by reference.

BACKGROUND

Service experiences abound on the Internet and the Web. New inventionssuch as block-chain based systems envision computer programs calledsmart contracts to provide services to smart devices such as autonomouscars. It is further envisioned that an overall service experience may bedisaggregated into multiple components wherein more than one serviceprovider may provide the individual components. Many smart devices,smart computer programs and service experiences also utilize dataobtained from sensor devices located in user computing devices orphysical environments wherein user devices are proximately located.Thus, service experiences entailing the use of autonomous cars maycollect increasing amounts of user data. Most service experiences arealso based on user provided information. Consumers have increasinglyshown signs of being concerned with preserving user data privacy. Aservice provisioning system that preserves user data privacy in onlinenetworks with sensor devices collecting increasingly larger amounts ofuser data will thus be of great social value and commercial benefit.

SUMMARY

In accordance with one aspect of the subject matter described herein, asystem and method is provided for facilitating delivery of a productand/or service to a user. In accordance with the method a firstexecutable computer code is caused to be inserted into a computingenvironment in which a user session is established. The first executablecomputer code is associated with an entity that provides the productand/or service. A user session is established in the computingenvironment. In response to the first executable computer code beinginserted into the user session, a first virtual machine is created inthe user session. The first executable computer code is executed in thefirst virtual machine, wherein executing the first executable computercode includes obtaining, over a communications network and from a usercomputing device of the user, a first proper subset of all informationneeded from the user computing device that is required to fulfilldelivery of the product and/or service. The first proper subset of allthe information is less than a complete set of all the informationneeded from the user computing device that is required to fulfilldelivery of the product and/or service. The first proper subset of theinformation is processed by the first executable computer code. Thefirst executable computer code produces first output data. Mediation ofthe information in the first proper subset of information is selectivelyenabled or disabled through an entity that obfuscates user informationattributes of the user before the first information is obtained by thefirst executable computer code. The first virtual machine is terminatedupon completion of executing the first executable computer code. Asecond executable computer code is obtained based at least on a firstportion of the first output data produced by the first executablecomputer code. The second executable computer code is caused to beinserted into the user session established in the computing environment.In response to the second executable computer code being inserted intothe user session, a second virtual machine is created in the usersession. The second executable computer code is executed in the secondvirtual machine, wherein executing the second executable computer codeincludes obtaining, over the communications network and from the usercomputing device, a second proper subset of all the information neededfrom the user computing device that is required to fulfill delivery ofthe product and/or service. The second proper subset of all theinformation is less than the complete set of all the information neededfrom the user computing device that is required to fulfill delivery ofthe product and/or service and includes information not included in thefirst proper subset of the information. The second proper subset of theinformation is processed by the second executable computer code. Thesecond executable computer code produces second output data. Mediationof the information in the second proper subset of information isselectively enabled or disabled through the entity that obfuscates userinformation attributes of the user before the second information isobtained by the second executable computer code. The second virtualmachine terminates upon completion of executing the second executablecomputer code. Based at least in part on the second output data producedby the second executable computer code, the product and/or service iscaused to be delivered to the user of the user computing device.

In accordance with another aspect of the subject matter describedherein, a system and method is provided for performing a transactionover a communications network. In accordance with the method, responsiveto a user request received over the communications network, a usersession is established in a computing environment. A plurality ofexecutable computer codes is executed in the computing environment thateach perform a portion of the transaction, wherein executing each of theexecutable computer codes includes obtaining over a communicationsnetwork and from a user computing device of the user, a different propersubset of all information needed from the user computing device that isrequired to complete the transaction. Each of the proper subsets of allthe information is less than a complete set of all the informationneeded from the user computing device that is required to complete thetransaction. Each of the executable computer codes processes therespective subset of information that it obtains. Mediation of theinformation in the different proper subsets of information isselectively enabled or disabled through an entity that obfuscates userinformation attributes of the user before the information is obtained bythe executable computer codes. Information is only exchanged between andamong the plurality of executable computer codes during execution ofeach of the executable computer codes by obtaining encrypted outputinformation that was previously output from one of the executablecomputer codes. The encrypted output information is encrypted such thatone or more decryption keys are required from the user in order todecrypt the output information. After completing execution of a finalone of the executable computer codes necessary to complete thetransaction, the user session is terminated so that each of the subsetsof information no longer exist in the computing environment.

In accordance with yet another aspect of the subject matter describedherein, a system and method is provided for a computer emulation systemrunning on one or more processors to facilitate delivery of a productand/or service to a user by a service provider over a communicationsnetwork. In accordance with the method, a product/service deliveryprocess is initiated by creating a session. A first virtual machine isrun in the session. The first virtual machine is configured to supportonly a pre-determined set of operations. The first virtual machine runsa first computer program. A user computing device is caused to beinvited into the session with the first computer program. Obfuscateduser data is obtained over the communications network from the usercomputing device. The user data that is obfuscated is user data that isrequired in order for the first computer program to cause delivery ofthe product and/or service to the user. Responsive to a request from thefirst computer program, the user data included in the obfuscated userdata is caused to be verified. The verification is achieved withoutrevealing any of the user data included in the obfuscated user data suchthat the first computer program is able to provision delivery of theproduct and/or service to the user without being in possession of anyinformation about the user after the product and/or service has beendelivered that the first computer program did not possess beforeinitiation of the delivery provisioning process. The user computingdevice is caused to be removed from the session with the first computerprogram upon receiving a request from the user computing device.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows elements of a decentralized transaction in an onlinepurchase of a book.

FIG. 2 shows exemplary linking information implicit in a decentralizedtransaction.

FIG. 3 shows one example of the overall operating environment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 4A shows a conventional DH algorithm.

FIG. 4B shows an illustrative extension of DH algorithm.

FIGS. 5A, 5B and 5C illustrate the operation of the extension to the DHalgorithm.

FIG. 6 shows an example of the contents that may be included in thedirectory.

FIG. 7 shows the working of the database processor with respect to asingle session containing a single VM.

FIG. 8A shows exemplary computer programs.

FIG. 8B shows examples of computer program instructions and theirsemantics.

FIG. 9 shows an exemplary rewriting of the programs of FIG. 8A implicitin the operation of the database program.

FIG. 10 shows an exemplary system architecture for an illustrativeembodiment.

FIGS. 11A, 11B and 11C depict details of the operation of anillustrative embodiment.

FIG. 12 shows a first illustrative commercial embodiment.

FIGS. 13A and 13B show a second illustrative commercial embodiment.

FIG. 14 shows exemplary service portability from one service provider toanother.

FIG. 15A is a duplicate of FIG. 10.

FIG. 15B shows an expanded view of the user computing device 100 andcomputing environment 200 of FIG. 15A wherein the computer/applicationprogram, CP, has been injected into a (distributed) computingenvironment.

FIG. 15C shows a new logical network element, the privacy switch,intended to provide privacy-preserving services to consumers.

FIG. 15D shows one embodiment of the privacy switch of FIG. 15C.

FIG. 16 shows communication paths between the UPS/User computing device,SPS and computing environment 200.

FIG. 17A shows the general architecture of the authentication provider.

FIG. 17B shows the general method by which a user computing device isprovisioned with credentials.

FIG. 17C summarizes the method of FIG. 17B.

FIG. 18A is a functional block diagram illustrating the operation of aKey Generating Engine (KGE) that generates cryptographic keys andobjects.

FIG. 18B is a functional block diagram illustrating the operation of aProof Generating Engine (PGE) that generates a cryptographic proof

FIG. 18C is a functional block diagram illustrating the operation of aProof Verifying Engine (PVE) that verifies the accuracy of thecryptographic credential.

FIGS. 19A, 19B and 19C show illustrative components that are inputted toand outputted by KGE.

FIGS. 20A and 20B show illustrative components that are inputted to andoutputted by PGE.

FIG. 21 shows an illustrative working of the PVE.

FIG. 22A shows the key generation by the authentication provider.

FIG. 22B shows credential generation by the authentication provider.

FIG. 22C shows credential generation by the user computing device.

FIG. 22D shows credential verification by a service provider.

FIG. 23 shows exemplary approximate objects.

FIGS. 24A, 24B and 24C illustrate an exemplary service using the methodsof the invention described herein.

Some drawings show message sequence diagrams depicting exemplaryinteractions between computer programs. Such drawings do not, ingeneral, depict the physical computers on which these programs, i.e.,computational entities, may run.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION Motivation

Web services and the business model of the web are critically dependenton data gathered from and about consumers. Customized, personalizedservices and user experiences are crafted using data gathered fromconsumers and, in some cases, acquired from third party providers.Advertisements, marketing of content and services, recommendations,etc., are all based in part on user data and the results of itsanalysis. As the web evolves to support sensors and sensor-based devicessuch as smart cars, smart household appliances, etc., the gathering ofuser data is expected to increase.

Concomitantly, the user community is becoming aware of the fact that webenterprises store large amounts of their personal data and thisawareness is leading many users to question the storing and use of userdata. Concerns regarding privacy of data are on the rise. Outages andbreaches of data at enterprises and hacking of enterprise softwaresystems exacerbate such concerns.

In some embodiments, the present invention describes system and methodsby which an open decentralized marketplace may be constructed thatoffers several features that address these concerns. The term “open”refers to the possibility of having multiple service providersinteracting without proprietary interfaces. The term “decentralized”refers to the notion that no single entity is in control and thatvarious entities may combine to offer an overall service.

The invention described herein allows users to reveal selected elementsof personal data to one or more service providers and obtain services.However, such provisioning of user data is controlled by the user whoreveals his data to a computational entity that, by design, cannotretain the provisioned data or its memory. That is, the computationalconstruct receives the user data, executes itself in an environment thatis “sterile” in a sense described later, and then terminates itself.

The one or more service providers may be organized as individualentities performing distinct functions that taken together constitutethe product and/or service provided to the user. As an example of suchan arrangement, consider an online book seller, payment processor andshipper that enter into a business arrangement by which a user maypurchase a book from the seller, pay for it using a payment processorand receive it in a shipment managed by the shipper.

In the present invention, the book seller, payment processor and shipperare represented by executable computer code such as computer programs orapps that are specially configured (described in more detail later) andwhich are received, e.g., downloaded, by user devices. The user devicesthen inject the programs into a (distributed) computing environmentcontaining a database processor. For purposes of illustration theindividual executable computer codes will be referred to as computerprograms, but more generally any suitable type of computer code may beemployed that is configured in the manner described herein.

Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to define a number ofterms that will be used throughout the description.

As used herein, the term “virtual machine” is to be given itsconventional meaning as used by those of ordinary skill in the art.Generally, a virtual machine is an emulation of a physical computersystem using hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof. Forinstance, “operating system level virtualization” is one known techniquefor implementing virtual machines. In this technique, a physicalcomputer is virtualized at the operating system level, enabling multiple“isolated” and “secure” “guest” (software) machines, i.e., virtualmachines, to run on a single physical computer. The term “secure”implies that only pre-determined operations can be executed in the guestmachine. The term “isolated” means that the operations may not accessresources in other guest machines. All guest machines share the samekernel, but may have individual user spaces. Thus, computer/applicationprograms running in a guest/virtual machine view it as a standalonecomputer system. Examples of software systems using operating systemlevel virtualization techniques include Solaris Containers, iCoreVirtual Accounts, Linux-VServer, etc.

We note that another known technique for supporting virtual machinesuses a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor that allows guest machinesto run their own kernels. For example, hypervisor may support threeguest/virtual machines running macOS, Windows, Linux, respectively, on asingle physical computer. Major Unix vendors sell virtualized hardware,e.g., Sun Microsystems, HP, etc.

In the descriptions that follow, a computing environment (or simply,environment) is a programmable arrangement of hardware, software and/orfirmware. The term “distributed computing environment” refers to aninter-connected programmable arrangement of hardware, firmware andsoftware. The term “database processor” may denote, in one embodiment,an operating system (OS) of a (distributed) computing environment, theOS being suitably configured to support features such as virtualmachines, session management, etc., as described herein.

The term “session” as used herein refers to a process of informationexchange between two or more communicating devices or computer programsin which information used in the exchange may be stored in a specificmemory or set of registers that are then cleared (“torn down” or“terminated”) later. Devices and/or computer programs may also beinvited and removed from a session or may initiate or terminate one ormore dialogs during a session where a dialog is a sequence of data itemsexchanged between devices and/or computer programs.

Certain operations in common use such as login, logout, registration,de-registration, etc., may incorporate or entail one or more aspects ofour notion of a session. Thus, a client device logging in to a servermay incorporate establishing a session between the client and server. Acomputer program may register itself with a server providing instantmessaging services; such an action may also entail establishing asession.

We will also have occasion to use the term “ephemeral”. The term denotesa data item that comes into existence in a session created by a computerprogram and is cleared before the session is terminated or as a part ofthe termination process of the session. For example, a computer programoperating in a session may receive and store an input data item from auser, or it may read a data item from a memory unit. The computerprogram may then finish execution and the session may be terminated,cleared or torn down. As a part of the session termination process, thememory unit and any internal registers of the computer system are alsocleared. In this way, the data items are deemed to be ephemeral.

It should be noted that the data processor performs various actions thatare not performed by conventional database processors. In particular,the database processor is configured to carry out three actions.

First, when connected to a user computing device that is seekingservice, the database processor creates a session between the usercomputing device and itself In some embodiments, the communicationchannel used to exchange data between the user device and the databaseprocessor is preferably secured. One example of such a secure protocolthat may be employed is discussed below.

Second, the database processor produces one or more virtual machines(VMs) that are provisioned with one of the aforementioned computerprograms. The VMs may be produced sequentially or in parallel. Each VMexecutes one of the provisioned computer programs, each of which mayproduce output that is restricted as explained later. The VMs areconfigured to terminate themselves at the conclusion of the execution ofthe provisioned computer program.

Finally, the database processor terminates the session establishedbetween the user device and the database processor. This action mayoccur if, e.g., the database processor determines that the servicerequest from the user device has been satisfied, or if the databaseprocessor receives a special command from the user device. The databaseprocessor clears any data outputted by the various VMs during thesession. We may say that the session has been “cleared” or that we“tear-down” the session to stand for the operation of clearing theoutputted data.

Thus, while the term “database processor” is known in prior art, it willbe seen that its use in the present invention requires several newinnovations and features, e.g., the creation and management of virtualmachines, etc.

Illustrative Example (Purchasing Books Online)

We begin by considering an illustrative example of a web serviceprovider such as an online bookstore. Currently several suchestablishments exist and they typically allow consumers to browse andselect books and purchase titles through an in-house payment system.Purchased books may then be delivered by another in-house shippingoperation. The online bookstore, thus, provides a “single stop” service.

The information that consumers are required to provide to such serviceproviders may comprise user name, billing address, shipping address,telephone number, credit card information, email address, and userID/password. (The service provider may also acquire additionalinformation about consumers and their actions from third-party providerswho gather information about users from cookies and other mechanisms.)

A consumer may be entitled to ask if all such information needs to beprovided. If we assume the enterprise to be decentralized into separateentities such as Seller, Payment and Shipper entities then a consumermay be able to provide only proper subsets of information to theindividual entities. For example, only his shipping address may beprovided to the Shipper who has no need for any other information.Similarly, the Seller needs only the title being purchased if thepayment for the title can be authenticated. The Payment processor needsonly to authenticate the consumer and the funds.

Thus, by decentralizing the online service provider into separateentities, a consumer may be able to provide subsets of his information,as needed, to the various entities.

However, the consumer is now burdened with performing actions to manage“linking information” that binds the individual actions (orsub-transactions) into a single transaction. In other words, theindividual sub-transactions may comprise selecting a book, making apayment and arranging a shipment. The linking information tells thePayment processor which Seller and title is being bought. Another pieceof linking information tells the Shipper what title and where to pick upthe shipment. The Seller needs to be told by the Payment processor whichtitle is being paid for and on behalf of whom. Etc.

Since consumers do not want to be burdened by such actions, onlinesystems allow state information to be passed between entities, e.g.,Seller, Payment and Shipper. The state information contains contextualinformation that allows individual sub-transactions to be linkedtogether into a single transaction. In prior art, terms such as tags ortokens have been used to describe computational constructs that containshared state information.

Automated sharing of tokens and tags between business entities allowsconsumers to be freed from managing the “linking information” associatedwith the individual sub-transactions. However, on the downside, it ispossible for a third-party to use the shared token/tags to re-constructthe entire transaction, resulting in the gathering of user informationinto a user profile. For example, user information contained in browser“cookies” is routinely used to construct integrated profiles of users.

A related problem is that entities receiving and using sharedtokens/tags must trust these instruments. Malicious users may insertspurious or malicious information into a token or a tag, e.g., re-directfunds or shipments to a malicious address.

It would, therefore, appear that decentralizing a service provider intoseparate entities still allows third-party enterprises to aggregate userinformation. It also introduces additional security and trust concernsregarding shared information.

Thus, it would be desirable to have an invention that provides a systemand methods providing the following features.

-   -   Online services are provided by a group of computer programs        organized as an open decentralized marketplace, i.e., a        distributed computing environment or network of computer        programs. . That is, business entities are represented by        computer programs that are inter-connected by an open networking        environment.    -   User information is partitioned into two classes (i) explicit        information, and (ii) latent information. Explicit information        is provided to a computer program by the consumer so that it may        perform its functions, e.g., shipping address provided by a        consumer as it is needed by a program so that the consumer may        receive goods at the indicated address. Latent information,        e.g., location information, is provided by sensor devices        associated with a user device.    -   It is not possible to link information outputted by the computer        programs to obtain an integrated user profile.    -   The user may experience an integrated experience despite the        above requirements.

An exemplary online transaction by which a consumer purchases a book andhas it delivered to his address comprises the following. (Namesbeginning with a capital letter in the descriptions below denotecomputer programs.)

-   -   The Seller requires that the customer must be located within a        pre-determined geographical area at the time of ordering, e.g.,        state of New York. (One reason for such a restriction may be        local tax laws.)    -   The customer must arrange payment from the online Payment        Processor. Seller needs proof of payment, i.e., payment amount        and title.    -   Payment Processor needs to authenticate the user.    -   Purchased titles will be made available by Seller to be picked        up by the

Shipper. Shipper needs a token (provided by the consumer in oneembodiment) information to pick up shipment and the delivery address.Shipper needs verification that Seller has authorized the title to bepicked up.

We assume consumers interact with the computer programs in the computingenvironment using devices, e.g., smart phones, hereinafter referred toas user computing devices. Thus, a consumer may also be thought of asbeing represented by a computer program running on his computing device.A consumer, John, wishing to purchase a title from Seller, utilizingprior art, may undertake the following sequence of steps (cf. FIG. 1).

In step 1, John visits Payment Processor and establishes an account byproviding information, as needed, to the Payment Processor. (Note: Thisaction may be considered as being a part of an initial setup phase.)John is issued an account number for future use.

In step 2, John visits a Location Certifying Authority (LCA) andprovides data from his GPS-enabled mobile device. LCA issues a token(Token-1) to John indicative of his location.

In step 3, John visits Seller and provides Token-1 to the Seller whoverifies that the token is valid and that John's location satisfiesSeller's constraint. John selects a title to be purchased. Seller issueshim a token (Token-2).

In step 4, John provides Token-2 to the Payment Processor who verifiesthat the token is valid, authenticates John, and provides a token(Token-3) to John indicating that he has processed a payment as perinformation contained in Token-2.

In step 5, John re-visits the Seller and presents Token-3. Sellerverifies that Token-3 is valid and that he has received the payment forthe selected title. As a by-product of the verification, Seller receivesinformation about the title being purchased, payment amount and someinformation about the purchaser, e.g., John's name or customer number.Seller issues a new token to John (Token-4).

In step 6, John visits Shipper and presents Token-4. Shipper verifiesthat the token is valid and that the shipment is ready and obtains adelivery address as a by-product of the verification process (asexplained later).

In step 7, using Token-4, Shipper picks up the shipment from Seller anddelivers it to the delivery address provided in step 6.

(We have assumed a certain distributed arrangement of service providingentities above for illustrative purposes; in practice, one or more ofthe service providing entities may be combined or further partitionedwithout limiting the present invention.)

The following observations are noteworthy about the above process.

-   -   The user must perform six of the seven steps (including the        initial setup step).    -   The total amount of information the user provides is the same        whether the consumer is provided service by a single provider or        a collection of providers.

It should also be observed that the computer programs may verifyinformation by using the various tokens. First, the Seller can verifythat the purchaser satisfies the location constraint using token-1.Next, the Seller can verify that a purchaser has paid for a purchase(using token-3) and that the purchaser satisfies the location constraint(token-1). As a further example of the linking phenomenon, note that theShipper can verify that a shipment is ready, that the shipment has beenpaid for, and that the purchaser satisfies the location constraint. Thearrows marked A, B, C and D in FIG. 2 depict the linking phenomenon.

In other words, an entity that has access to all the tokens mayeffectively re-construct the entire transaction and, thus, derive anintegrated user profile.

It is worthwhile here to note that advanced decentralized and opensystems and environments such as Bitcoin and ledger-based block-chainsystems have reported that certain entities have been able to linkinformation from computer programs, e.g., smart contracts ortransactions, and create composite user profiles.

Thus, to protect the user's private data, it would be desirable to havea solution that prevents a third-party to construct suchintegrated/composite user profiles using customer data, e.g., by puttingtogether the linking information A, B, C and D in FIG. 2. This is thegoal of the present invention.

In the following descriptions, we note two cases.

-   -   1. User data may be obtained by computer programs from sensors        located within a user device, e.g., GPS location data from a        smartphone, or from sensor devices external to the user device,        e.g., a fitness bracelet associated with a user's smartphone.    -   2. A consumer may provide information by user input to a service        provider, e.g., by entering a shipping address, or the user's        device may provide user data via one or more applications        running on the user device.

Some embodiments of the subject matter described herein address both theabove cases.

General System and Methods of Invention

FIG. 3 depicts a high level schematic diagram of one example of anoperating environment in which the subject matter described herein maybe implemented. Illustrative user computing devices 100 and 150 may beassociated with internal sensors, e.g., sensor 51, or external sensors,e.g., sensor 52. The external sensors may communicate with itsrespective user device over a communication link such as Bluetooth,Wi-Fi, etc. Examples of user computing devices include, withoutlimitation, mobile communication devices (e.g., cellular phones, smartphones), personal computers, laptops, tablet computers, smart watches,wearable computers (e.g., fitness bands), personal digital assistants(PDAs), wearable medical devices such as smart bandages and the like.

User computing devices may be connected, using wireless and/or wirednetworking links, to a distributed computing environment 200 thatcontains a database processor 203, i.e., a hardware processor that runsa computer program that executes computer programs supplied to it, akinto a compiler that executes computer programs. To carry the analogyforward, a compiler executes programs written using computer programmingor specification languages such as FORTRAN. The database processorexecutes computer programs using a specification language describedbelow.

The database processor 203 when requested to execute a suitablyspecified computer program produces a computational object called asession, such as sessions 202-1 and 202-2 shown in FIG. 3. The databaseprocessor 203 may have any number of sessions operating at any giventime within the distributed computing environment 200. A session maycontain one or more virtual machines VMs. In the example of FIG. 3 thetwo sessions 202-1 and 202-2 contain several VMs 204.

A session also contains a data store in which the data is categorizedinto two lists, called TL (Token List) and PL (Program List). Forinstance, session 202-1 includes data store 201-1 and session 202-2includes data store 201-2. Typically, only one data store per session iscreated. Details of the operations performed by the database processoron data in the TL and PL lists are provided later.

In practice, in some embodiments the database processor may beimplemented as a computer virtualization program in which the kernel ofan operating system allows the creation and termination of one or moreuser spaces wherein one or more session objects may be created. Thedatabase processor creates one or more VMs in a session object thatoperate on the TL and PL lists in the data store in the session.Computer software virtualization is well-known in prior art.

Data from Sensor Devices

A user computing device is a device containing one or more processorswith one or more network connections (fixed and/or wireless) andpossibly one or more sensors that detect the state of the device or itsenvironment. As previously mentioned, examples of user computing devicesinclude smart phones, tablet computers, laptop/desktop computers, smartcars, smart household appliances, wearable computers, etc.

Referring to the illustrative example in FIG. 3, we note that the sensor51 may produce data such as e.g., geographic location data, ambienttemperature, user motion data, etc., that is received by the distributedcomputing environment 200 from the user device 100 and stored in datastore 201.

A computer program operating on such sensor data may need to ensure thatthe data is being produced by a trusted sensor. To achieve a trustmodel, one implementation proceeds as follows.

We require that a sensor (internal or external) associated with a usercomputing device that is to provide data to a computer program mustfirst be registered with the computer program.

Establishing a secure connection between two entities is well-known inprior art. For example, we may use the Diffie-Hellman (DH) method. TheDH algorithm operates by constructing a secret that is shared by the twocommunicating parties. It works as follows.

Let the two parties be named as A and B. (We may assume the A and B tobe computer programs.) A and B agree on two prime numbers, “g” and “p”.Next, A generates a secret number, say “a”, and B generates a secretnumber “b”. “A” computes:

g ^(a)(mod p)=x

and B computes:

g ^(b)(mod p)=y

A and B exchange the computed numbers “x” and “y”. “A” discovers thatthe number, “y”, he receives from “B” is equal to the number he hadgenerated, viz., “x”. Similarly, B discovers that the number hereceives, “x”, from A is equal to the number, “y”, he had generated. Themutually agreeing discovery is based on the mathematical property ofexponentiation and commutativity of integer multiplication:

(g ^(a)mod p)^(b)(mod p)=g ^(ab)(mod p)

(g ^(b)mod p)^(a)(mod p)=g ^(ba)(mod p)

FIG. 4A shows two computer programs named Alice and Bob using theconventional DH protocol/method to secure an open channel. We brieflydescribe the DH protocol to familiarize the reader with the notion ofprotocols.

In step 1, both Alice and Bob agree on the integers “g” and “p” and instep 2, a secure channel is set up between them using the standard DHalgorithm. In step 3, Alice chooses a random integer “a”, computes(g^(a)mod p) and sends the result to Bob in step 4. Bob chooses a randominteger “b” in step 5, computes (g^(b)mod p) and sends the result toAlice in step 6. In steps 7 a and 7 b, both Alice and Bob computeK=(g^(ab)mod p) as indicated. In step 8 both agree to use the computed“K” as an encryption key for future messages exchanged between them.

Use of the DH protocol assures programs Alice and Bob that they maysecurely exchange messages between themselves over an open publicchannel if they use the computed key “K”. That is, Alice wishing to senda message “m1” to Bob, encrypts it using a function encrypt(m1, K)=m2.Bob, upon receiving “m2”, may decrypt it using a function decrypt(m2,K)=m1.

Whereas the DH algorithm for secure communications between two partiesis well-known, it may also be extended for three or more parties.However, such extensions may involve extra exponentiation/encryptionsteps to be carried out by the participating parties. In some cases, wemay also need multiple messages to be broadcast between all thecommunicating entities. Since, exponentiation is an expensive process,and we may have many sensor devices associated with a user device, suchextensions to DH may become prohibitively expensive. Also, hardwarecapable of doing exponentiation operations (or do them quickly) may notbe available in sensor devices. Thus, when considering the use of DH inchannels with multiple sensor devices, we may wish to use lesscomputationally expensive methods.

It is known that the DH algorithm has vulnerabilities in certainsituations. (Techniques are also known that may be used to mitigatethese vulnerabilities.) However, our method of associating sensordevices with a first party that has established a secure channel with asecond party does not depend on using the DH algorithm to set up thesecure channel; any algorithm that establishes a secure channel betweentwo parties may be used.

Thus, our description of the DH algorithm above is purely pedagogicaland serves as an enabling example. Any method that establishes a securechannel between two parties may be used in conjunction with our method.

We now present our method and note that it is light weight and allowsassociating multiple sensor devices with a user computing device. Thatis, we consider channels in which sensor devices (s1, s2, s3, etc.) maybe associated with a user computing device “ud” that, in turn, has asecure connection to a computer program “A” operating on data stored indatabase “db”. We may depict this situation as follows.

[s1, s2, s3, . . . ]---ud---db---A

Our approach may be generally described as the following sequence ofsteps (FIG. 4B). The illustration shows a single sensor deviceregistered with a computer program. In practice, several sensor devicesmay be registered with a single computer program. A sensor device mayalso be registered with more than one computer program.

-   -   1. Establish a session between the “ud”, the “db” and the        computer program “A”.    -   2. Establish a secure connection between “ud” and “db” using a        suitable algorithm. In one embodiment, we use the DH algorithm        to establish the secure connection, thus the “ud” and “db” agree        on an encryption function, say K (based on the shared secret),        the prime base “g” and modulus “p”.    -   3. The program “A” requests the sensor device to register itself        and issues a registration identifier to the sensor device. The        latter provides a hashed version of the identifier to the user        device. Note that the function used herein is different than the        agreed upon hash function in step 2 above.    -   4. The sensor device sends sensor data to “db” that causes it to        be stored.    -   5. “A” requests sensor data from “db” and is re-directed to “ud”        along with certain parameters.    -   6. “A” requests and receives authorization from “ud” based on        the parameters from step 5 and its previously issued identifier        (that is only known to “A” and sensor device, “s1”).    -   7. Upon being authorized, “A” accesses data from “db”.    -   8. The session established in step 1 above is cleared.

We now provide a fuller description of the above process with referenceto FIG. 5A.

In steps 1 a, we establish a session between the user device, a firstcomputer program (which in some embodiments may be the databaseprocessor referred to herein), and a second computer program. In step 1b, the user device and the first computer program agree on “g” (primebase) and “p” (prime modulus).

In step 2, we establish a secure channel between the user device and thefirst computer program. Either DH or some suitable algorithm may beused. We assume the use of DH for illustrative purposes.

In step 3, the sensor device is initialized, i.e., its software logic istriggered or launched, and in step 4 a, the second program issues aregistration request to the sensor device. We may assume that the secondcomputer program needs the sensor data. The request is sent to the userdevice since the second computer program may not know the address of thesensor device. The user device forwards the request to the sensordevice, along with the address of the second computer program.

In step 4 b, the sensor device requests the second computer program foran identifier and it is provided the identifier denoted “D” in step 5.It is also provided with the name of an encryption function, say H, (orthe executable code of the encryption function). (For example, thesensor device may have been pre-provisioned with one or more encryptionfunctions by its manufacturer). In step 6 a, the sensor device hashes“D” using function “H” and sends the result to the user device. Notethat the user device is unaware of “D”, it only receives H(D). It isrequired that the encryption function “H” be different from theencryption function “K” from step 2.

In step 6 b, the user device computes ĝHD) (“̂” denotes theexponentiation operation) and sends the result to the databaseprocessor. In step 7, the sensor device starts to generate sensor dataand sends it to the database processor who causes it to be stored forlater retrieval by other computer programs.

Anticipating that one or more computer programs may request access tothe sensor data and that it will use the user device to authorize therequests of such computer programs, the database processor generates anauthentication identifier, A, and sends it to the user device (steps 8Aand 8B, cf. FIG. 5B).

The user device now performs the series of computations shown in step 9(FIG. 5B). The goal of these steps is twofold. First, we wish toincorporate the sensor device identifier and the authenticationidentifier into a secret. This will allow the user device to verify thesensor device when requested by the database processor.

Second, incorporating the authentication identifier into a secret willallow the user device to verify the sensor device to a second computerprogram (different than the database processor) when requested (as shownbelow).

The computation shown in step 9 (cf. FIG. 5B) results in the derivationof 3 parameters T, U and V that are associated with the authenticationidentifier produced by the database processor and the identifier “D”assigned to the sensor device. (Note, that all identifiers are requiredto be integers so that we may perform the stated computations.)

In step 10, the user device sends the parameters T, U and V to thedatabase processor for storage. It is to be noted that the databaseprocessor and the user device have previously agreed upon the prime base“g” when setting up the DH secure channel, and that it iscomputationally hard for an entity, e.g., the computer program shown inFIG. 5B, that does not know “g” to derive the parameters T, U and V.Note also that the authentication identifier “A” provided by thedatabase processor to the user device is needed for computing theparameters.

Having set up the channel and stored the various derived parameters, wenow consider the case wherein a second computer program requests accessto the sensor data (step 11, FIG. 5C). The database processor, by one ofthe tenets of the present invention, needs permission from the userdevice. Contemporaneously, the second computer program wishes to beensured that the sensor device is authorized to provide the requestedinformation.

To achieve these two goals, the computer program is re-directed (step12A) to seek permission from the user device. The re-directioninstruction is overloaded by providing it the parameters A, T, U and Vpreviously associated with the sensor device and stored in the databaseby the user device, as shown in FIG. 5B.

In step 12B, the second computer program sends the identifier “D” (onlyknown to the second computer program and the sensor device) and theparameters A, T, U and V to the user device. The latter (steps 13C and13D) uses U and V and the prime base (known only to it and the databaseprocessor) to derive Z (as shown) and compares it to the value of T(received from the second computer program). (Note that Z depends onknowledge of U and V that in turn depend on knowing U, V, A, etc.) Asuccessful match assures the user device that the A, T, U and Vparameters were provided to the second computer program by the databaseprocessor. (Recall that it is computationally hard for a computerprogram to generate T, U and V without knowing “g” and the encryptionkey K.)

Furthermore, the user device computes H(D) in step 13A and in step 13Bcompares it to the hashed value of “D” it received from the sensordevice in step 6 a. A successful match indicates that the secondcomputer program provided the identifier to the sensor device.

In step 14, the user device marks the identifier “D” as having beenauthenticated and sends it to the database processor who may in step 15allow access to the second computer program. The second computer programmay now, in step 16, use the authorization provided by the databaseprocessor to issue a data access request to the database processor.

Once data access is complete, the session established in step la may becleared (step 17).

Illustrative Embodiment Involving Sensor Devices

As a practical example of the use of the above method, consider a personwho owns a smart car (e.g., a self-driving vehicle) that comes equippedwith a key fob that allow the person to control various functions of thecar, e.g., unlock the car, summon the car to a location where the owneris waiting, etc.

We assume the following correspondences using some of the terms from thedescriptions provided above.

-   -   1. The key fob of a car corresponds to the sensor device.    -   2. The owner's smart phone corresponds to the user computing        device.    -   3. A computer program running in a computer environment is to be        referred to as a “first computer program”.    -   4. An application program running on one or more processors        inside the smart car is to be referred to as the second program.

As another example of a sensor device (different from a key fob), asmart car may have an installed device to manage payment to toll booths,i.e., the toll paying device is triggered by equipment in a toll laneand the device interacts with the equipment to make a payment based on apre-provisioned bank/credit card account. That is, in this case we mayhave two sensor devices (i) the toll paying device installed in the car,and (ii) the key fob which is carried by the owner/driver. As explainedabove, the two sensor devices may establish independent registrationswith the second computer program, i.e., the program running in the car'sprocessor(s).

Current toll paying devices, e.g., EZ-Pass in New York, are permanentlylinked to a user's bank account irrespective of who may be driving orcontrolling the car at any given moment. Using the inventions describedherein, a suitably configured toll paying device may be preferentiallyinstalled in the car and tied to a user device carried by the driver.The user device then authorizes the toll paying device to use the bankaccount designated by the user/owner of the user device. Thus, if userJohn is driving the car and has his smart phone with him, the tollpaying device charges John's account. If the same car were being drivenby a different user, say Mary, who is carrying her smart phone thenMary's bank account would be charged for tolls. Thus, e.g., carmanufacturer's may provide cars with pre-installed toll paying devices.Furthermore, car rental companies may utilize such cars since, incurrent practice, the rental companies are liable for toll paymentssince they “own” the toll paying devices, i.e., a toll paying device inthe rental car is associated with the rental company's bank account orcredit card.

The protocol described above associates the sensor device, e.g., the keyfob or the toll paying device, with the user computing device. The usercomputing device, the first and second computer programs establish asession with a secure channel between the user device and the firstcomputer program. The first computer program may be executed by, e.g., acar manufacturer's cloud computing environment, and the second computerprogram, e.g., may run on processors provided in the smart car. (Incertain embodiments, the cloud computing environment may periodicallyprovide—e.g., using a download operation—executable codes to one or moreprocessors in the car so that no connection is needed to the cloudcomputing environment.) The second program needs data from the sensordevice to provide services to the driver/owner. In some cases, thesecond program may need to ascertain that the key fob is within acertain distance of the car. In other cases, the second program may needto ensure that the key fob is authorized, e.g., is the key fobauthorized by the user device to make a toll payment?

The key fob may be used to launch various services by the owner/driverwithout being present in the car. For example, a command issued from thekey fob may cause the car to be driven to a designated location, or toheat the car's interior to a certain temperature, etc.

It is important to note that the owner/driver's information is notstored in the second program that runs in the car's processor(s). Thesecond program may read the data stored by the first program and use thedata. (This aspect is explained further in later descriptions.) At theend of the execution of the second program, the memory of the processorexecuting the latter program is cleared. At the end of the owner/driversession, session data is also cleared as will be explained below.

Thus, the car's equipment only has access to the user's data whilst itsprocessors are executing services for the user and these processors donot retain the user's data after their execution.

A Note on Encryption Keys

In addition to the encryption key agreed upon by the database processorand the user computing device as per the description above, we assumethat the user device is provisioned with one or more additionalencryption/decryption keys. In examples provided later, we will haveoccasion to discuss the need to encrypt or decrypt data. To thatpurpose, such programs are required to seek the relevant keys from theuser device that, in turn, may provide the keys using an internalpolicy, e.g., choose to provide a key at random from the list ofprovisioned keys, or choose to provide a key that has not been used forsome pre-determined amount of time, etc.

Database Processor and Virtual Machines

Having handled sensor data, we now turn to describe the handling of userprovided information. For instance, in the example in which the onlineservice provider is an online bookstore, the user provided informationwill include a shipping address, payment account number, etc. To thispurpose, we need to describe further the details of the databaseprocessor, i.e., the sessions, VMs and the executable computer codes(e.g., computer programs) that it creates and manages.

One or more service providers create computer programs or apps using aspecification language described later which are stored in a directory.In one embodiment, the directory is an internal component of thedistributed computing environment 200, FIG. 3. In other embodiments, thedirectory may be implemented as a standalone system. In one embodiment,the directory contains addresses of online locations (servers, websites,etc.) from which the computer programs may be accessed. Thus, thedirectory may contain a searchable list of computer programs.

Exemplary computer programs may perform actions of a “Book Seller” or“Payment Processor”, “Shipper”, etc. Other exemplary service providersmay provide programs that enable “smart car services” or “medicalservices”, etc. FIG. 6 shows a few exemplary entries in the proposeddirectory of programs.

The column titled “Program Name Matching” represents the name of acomputer program. The column title “Overall Service Description”represents a general phrase describing the service provided by the namedprogram. The “User Info List” column provides a list of all the userdata attributes that will be required from the user for the provisioningof the service if it is requested. It should be noted that propersubsets of these user data attributes are to be provided to thedifferent computer programs that are required to deliver the service tothe user. That is, none of the individual programs, including theprogram provided by the online service provider from whom the userinitially requests the service (e.g., the bookseller), is to receive allof the user data attributes included in the “user info list” of FIG. 6.The latter is further discussed below.

It is envisioned that the directory is organized as to enable onlinesearching by the database processor. For example, the column “ProgramName Matching” may be organized as a searchable data structure, enablingthe database processor to efficiently search and verify the existence ofan entry, i.e., a computer program, in the directory. The column labeled“Name & Address of Supplier” is meant to describe the name of thesupplier and its online locations, e.g., IP addresses, websiteaddresses, etc., from whom the named computer programs may be obtained.It is envisioned that users may search the directory to find computerprograms, e.g., by names of suppliers.

Searching and discovering programs in the directory further implies thata user may state searchable attributes, e.g., find a program enablingbuying books. For example, assume a program named “Book” in thedirectory. It may have associated search attributes such as “buying abook”, “cheap books”, etc. The column “Search Attributes” in the tableof FIG. 6 is intended to convey this notion.

We will also have occasion for computer programs to find “matching”names or other identifiers of computer programs in the directory, e.g.,given a name of a program, N, find a computer program in the directorywhose name matches the name “N”. Thus, we assume that the directorycontains entries that contain names or other identifiers of computerprograms. The column “Program Name Matching” in FIG. 6 is intended toconvey this notion.

In practice, all the various kinds of search mechanisms described abovemay be combined using Boolean connectives such as AND, OR and NOT. Thus,e.g., find a program with name N, supplied by supplier-3, withattributes “buying books”, etc.

A user may search the directory, find a program and may download theprogram to his user computing device. When seeking service from aservice provider, a user may ask the database processor to initiate asession and inject the discovered program into the PL list of the datastore of the session (FIG. 3). Alternatively, the user may take actionsor issue commands when searching the directory that cause the databaseprocessor to create a session and inject the discovered computer programinto the PL list of that session. We use the phrase “user device causesthe injection of a computer program” to denote either of theseembodiments.

To obtain a service or product or otherwise perform any onlinetransaction, a user device issues a request to the database processor.The request causes the database processor to initiate a session, createone or more virtual machines, say VM1, VM2, etc., and initialize the TLand PL lists in the data store in the session (FIG. 3). Note thatinitially the TL and PL lists are empty. The user device causes a nameof a discovered program to be injected into the list PL.

The database processor is further configured to begin monitoring thelist PL for names of programs as described later. If a name is found inthe list PL, the database attempts to find one or more computer programsin the directory whose names match the name inserted into the PL list.

Since the database processor is monitoring the PL list, it may find oneor more computer programs in the directory whose names match the namethat was caused to be injected by the user device.

The database processor fetches the one or more matching programs in thedirectory and inserts each such program into one virtual machine in thesession and requests each virtual machine to execute the injectedprogram. As the injected programs begin execution in VM1, VM2, they mayproduce output. As will be shown later, the output of such programs isgenerally constrained to be of two forms: tokens that contain encrypteddata and the names or other identifiers of computer programs. The namesor other identifiers are in the clear.

The database processor is configured to store the (encrypted) tokensthat may be outputted by a program executing in a VM into the TL list ofthat session. Any names of programs outputted by an executing program ina VM are stored in the PL list of that session.

We may thus state a monitoring condition that specifies operation of thedatabase processor:

[Monitoring Condition, MC]. The database processor searches the PL listin each session for the names of computer programs and finds computerprograms in the directory whose names match the name(s) in the PL list.For example, consider a computer program in the directory whose name is“P”, i.e.,

-   -   Program: Name =“P”        Now suppose PL contains the name “P”. The matching condition in        this case would be satisfied.

When a program executing in a VM terminates its execution, the programand the VM in which it executes are both cleared. When all VMs in asession have been cleared, the session is terminated.

The above process of monitoring the program list, creating sessions andVMs in which programs run and produce outputs that populate PL and TL,etc., continues until no new matches can be found using the MCcondition. We may encapsulate the above described process by thefollowing method denoted Method RM:

-   -   1. Receive a user request. Create a session and its data store        containing the lists PL and TL.    -   2. User causes the name of a program to be injected in PL.    -   3. The database processor runs the monitoring process using the        condition MC.    -   4. If successful matches are found, the matched computer        programs are fetched from the directory, each program is        inserted into a VM that is created for this purpose and the VM        is configured to execute the inserted program. The programs may        operate on the data in the TL list. Their outputs may comprise        names of programs that are inserted into the PL list, or tokens        that are inserted into the TL list.    -   5. A name in the PL list that has been matched against the        contents of the directory is removed from the PL list so that        duplicate matches do not occur.    -   6. If a program executing in a VM finished execution, the VM is        cleared.    -   7. Repeat steps 4, 5 and 6 until the PL list becomes empty.    -   8. Clear the session.

Thus, the above operations of the database processor for a singlesession may be depicted as shown in FIG. 7. The session object 202contains a VM 204 executing a program 205 operating on and storingtokens in TL 41, and outputting program names to PL 31. The databaseprocessor 203 has access to a directory server 500. Note that thedirectory server 500 may also be accessed by user computing devicesdesirous of searching or discovering computer programs as describedabove. The database processor 203 is configured to operate according tomethod RM as described above.

It remains to describe the computer programs executed in VMs created bythe database processor. We first describe an exemplary case.

Consider the three computer programs named Book, Payment and Shipment ofFIG. 8A.

The program “Book” comprises instructions that are mostlyself-explanatory. Thus, “Display Book List to user” is interpreted tomean that when the computer program executes the indicated instruction,a list of books is displayed on the user device. Note that the data inthe list is assumed to be provided, a priori, to the computer program,e.g., the program may be initially provisioned with such a list. (Thespecification of the user device will be “bound” at run-time—the bindingof variables in computer instructions to specific entities is well-knownin prior art.) As another example, the instruction “Ask user for titleof book” seeks input from user device. Such information is provided bythe user at run-time.

The instruction “Get user device location” is an instruction to executea procedure akin to the one described earlier by means of which sensordata from a user device is accessed.

The instruction “Token: location” bears further description. Theinstruction is meant to indicate the encapsulation of the data“location” into an encrypted form that is outputted to TL 41 (FIG. 7).Generally, token instructions contain a list of data elements that areto be encrypted and then outputted to the list 41. The encryption key isto be obtained from the user device that initiates the session in whichthe program is executing, e.g., by using the instruction “get” as asubroutine.

The instruction “Output: Payment” is similar to the token instructionabove, except that the name “Payment” is not encrypted.

The program labeled “Payment” in FIG. 8A contains the instruction“Input: title, location” that conveys the instruction to read tokens“title” and “location” from the token list 41 (FIG. 7) and, since theindicated elements are encrypted as per above, to decrypt the indicatedelements using a key obtained from the user device again, e.g., usingthe “get” instruction as a subroutine). Note that program “Payment”creates tokens for “amount” and “pay” that are stored in encrypted formin list 41 (FIG. 7). Furthermore, whereas the program acquires the data“user name” from the user device, it does not create a token for it.This is a design feature of the program specification language describedherein, i.e., data acquired or computed by a program may not be,optionally, outputted.

The instructions of program “Shipment” may be similarly described. It isto be noted that “Shipment” does not create any tokens and does not haveany “Output” instructions.

FIG. 8B summarizes the new kinds of instructions shown in the exemplaryprogram of FIG. 8A along with their semantics.

Given the exemplary descriptions above of the computer programs, aspecification language for computer programs suitable for the purposesof this invention may be taught. The language in question consists ofprogramming instructions similar to most conventional programminglanguages with the exception of the new instructions “token”, “display”,“get”, “ask”, “output” and “input” whose general operations have beendescribed above and which may be implemented using conventional means ofsubroutines, encryption and decryption.

The instructions “get” and “ask” that obtain information from userdevices have an additional functionality as follows.

The execution of both instructions is monitored by the databaseprocessor. Such monitoring may be enabled, e.g., by ensuring that bothinstructions, when attempting to access a user device, are configured tofirst access the database processor and the latter accesses the usercomputing device. That is, the database processor mediates the accessrequests from “get” and “ask” to the user device.

The monitoring of the “get” and “ask” instructions is further configuredto ensure the following two conditions.

-   -   1. The informational attributes asked of the user device by        “get” and “ask” instructions are contained within the specified        “User Info List” associated with the service (cf. FIG. 5).    -   2. No single computer program may ask and obtain ALL of the        informational attributes from the user device.

The above two conditions compel service providers to provide servicesthat utilize more than one computer program and limit the totality ofinformation that a single computer program may receive from a userdevice. The above two conditions, along with the actions of encryptingthe identifiers in the token list and the termination and clearing ofthe VMs and the session object constitute the trust model provided bythe database processor to the user community.

The database processor operates in a manner as to preserve the trustmodel. In this sense, the latter represents a contract between the usercommunity and the database processor, i.e., the trust model specifiesthe meaning of the phrase “user data privacy”, the contract beingenforced by the database processor.

The operation of the database processor may now be further described inFIG. 9 and as follows with respect to the programs shown in FIG. 8A.

The user device issues a request to the database processor thatestablishes a session and begins monitoring the PL and TL lists. Theuser device injects the program named “Book” in the program list. Thedatabase processor monitors the program list PL, attempting to findmatching entries in the directory. When it finds a successful match,i.e., condition MC is satisfied, it executes method RM.

Execution of method RM causes the creation of a VM in which the programnamed “Book” begins execution. The output of the program, namely thetokens “location” and “title of book” are stored in TL in encryptedform, and the string “Payment” (in the clear) is stored in the PL.

The program “Book” terminates and the database processor terminates theVM. The monitoring process continues since the PL list is not empty,i.e., it contains the name “Payment”. The monitoring now finds a matchbetween the directory entries and the name “Payment” in PL.

The database processor, since it has found MC to be satisfied, creates asecond VM in which the program named “Payment” begins execution,producing tokens “amount” and “pay” (in encrypted form) in TL and theclear string “Shipment” in PL. After the program “Payment” concludes,its VM is terminated.

Since PL is still non-empty, the monitoring by the database processorcontinues and finds a successful satisfaction of MC, whereby a VM iscreated to execute the program named “Shipment” operating on tokens“amount” and “pay”. This VM is also terminated when “Shipment” concludesits execution. No names of programs are outputted by the program“Shipment”. Thus, the list PL becomes empty and no more matches arefound. The database processor may terminate and clear the session.

Technical Explanation of the Database Processor

A technical explanation may be provided of the working of the databaseprocessor. To receive service provisioning from a service provider, auser device injects a computer program into a computational environmentwhere the computer program may execute. The running of the computerprogram is controlled in the manner in which it asks for user data orproduces output, e.g., the output of the computer programs isconstrained to be either tokens written to the token list or names orother identifiers of computer programs written to the PL list.

Furthermore, the computer program rewrites itself, in the sense of aPost Rewriting System [cf. Emil Post (1947), Recursive Unsolvability ofa Problem of Thue, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 12 (1947) pp.1-11. Reprinted in Martin Davis ed. (1965), The Undecidable: BasicPapers on Undecidable Propositions, Unsolvable Problems and ComputableFunctions, Raven Press, New York, pp. 239ff]. That is, a computerprogram S rewrites itself as computer program T given the data contexts“u” and “v”, known as pre- and post-contexts, respectively. The notation

-   -   uSv→uTv        denotes the above notion.

An implementation of such a rewriting system thus retains no “memory”,since the state uTv may not be rewritten as uSv, i.e., the “arrow” mayonly be traversed from left-to-right and not in the backwards directionand that the pre- and post-contexts, i.e., the “u” and “v” remainunchanged in the left and right-hand sides of the above notation.

As will become clear momentarily, we will associate data elements in theTL list (41, cf. 7) with the pre- and post-contexts, i.e., the “u” and“v” in the above notation. We will associate computer programs denotedby the upper-case letters such as “S” and “T”, etc., with names ofprograms in the program list PL (31, cf. FIG. 7). Thus, the notation“uSv→uTv” may be interpreted as “if the program S operating on input “u”produces output “v” then S may be rewritten as T (with the same inputand output data contexts)”.

In the present invention, computer programs or apps, provided by e.g.,service providers, are injected by a user device into a computationalenvironment. The environment generates a session with virtual machinesfor executing the injected computer programs, with each computer programbeing executed in its own virtual machine. Assume an injected computerprogram, say S, is provided with input “u”. S executes, i.e., runs inthe virtual machine, and produces output, i.e., token, “v” and the nameof a program, T. The output (and input) elements are associated with thesession and not the virtual machines in the session.

The session, at this juncture, contains the data “u”, the data “v”, andthe program S. The computational environment terminates and clears theprogram S and its associated virtual machine and accesses the directoryto get a program, say T, which is injected into the session. The sessionnow contains the program T and the contexts “u” and “v”. We may thusrepresent the above operation of the computational environment by sayingthat the computational environment rewrites S as T using the rule“uSv→uTv”. Given the exemplary programs shown in FIG. 8A, we maydescribe the working of the database processor as the rewriting implicitin the following pair of Post rewriting rules. Note that “<>” denotesthe empty context.

<>Book<title><location>→

-   -   <>Payment<title><location>

<pay><amount>Payment<>→

-   -   <pay><amount>Shipment<>        wherein the database processor is provided a suitable directory        containing programs Book, Payment, and Shipment. FIG. 9 shows a        pictorial rendition of the rewriting process by the labels R1        and R2. Additionally, FIG. 9 shows lists TL 41 and PL 31        containing the indicated contextual elements.

The preceding paragraphs have described a process R1 (FIG. 9) in which afirst VM, VM1, is created for the execution of program named Book. Theoutput produced by this program is used by the database processor asmatching criteria to locate a second program “Payment.” The databaseprocessor then creates a second VM2, causing the execution of theprogram “Payment” in VM2. The causality relationship between theprograms “Book” and “Payment” is referred to as a rewriting operationencapsulated in the above descriptions as represented by a rewrite ruleR1 of Post logic.

Similarly, the operation R2 denotes the rewriting of program Amount asprogram Shipment and the rewriting is shown as label R2.

It is to be noted that the rewriting operation is not explicitlydescribed or contained in any component of the database processor. It isimplicit in the operation of the database processor, i.e., it is aside-effect of the monitoring condition and the method RM by which thedatabase processor operates.

Thus, condition MC and method RM executed by the database processorserve to describe, implicitly, the operation of program rewriting. Suchimplicit working of the rewriting process is by design. Since therewriting process is never declared explicitly, it is never availablefor access by third parties, and hence it may not be used to discern theinformation that links different data elements together.

Illustrative Embodiment

We now provide descriptions of an illustrative embodiment of the presentinvention (cf. FIG. 10).

Various sensor devices 10 (FIG. 10) may be located in an environmentalso containing a user device 100 that may contain one or more(internal) sensor devices 11. The devices 10 may be in association withthe user device 100 by means of link 3. Alternatively, they may beaggregated via link 5 to a server 30 that is associated with the userdevice 100 via link 105. The user device 100 is connected to thedistributed computing environment 200 via link 95. It may also haveaccess to the directory server. The database processor program describedabove (203, cf. FIG. 3) runs in the environment 200.

The environment 200 is also linked to a directory server 500 and anapplication server 600. The latter may also be optionally connected tothe directory server.

The database processor creates session objects and VMs, etc., asdescribed above. These are not shown in FIG. 10 since they have beendescribed above and shown in FIG. 3.

We consider an application which enables the user to buy a book online,pay for it and arrange its shipping. The entire process appears as anend-to-end or unitary transaction to the user, though it may be carriedout by multiple interacting entities, i.e., computer programs suppliedby various providers. The user utilizes his user device and providesinformation, e.g., title of book, payment, etc., as needed. Someinformation, e.g., location, may be gleaned from sensors in his device.All information is provided to a database processor operating in amanner as to preserve the user's information in the sense that theindividual components of the unitary transaction may not be linked toderive an overall knowledge about the user. Furthermore, the individualcomponents of the unitary transaction that receive user information arecomputational entities that are created and cease to exist to carry outa computation and then cease to exist.

Service providers using application servers create computer programsoffering various services to users of user computing devices and smartdevices. Smart devices generally refer to devices containing one or moreprocessors, one or more network interfaces and one or more sensors tosense environmental indicia from their surroundings. Examples of smartdevices include smart appliances, smart vehicles, and so on. A directoryserver is populated with the computer programs so created and offered toconsumers. A consumer using a user computing device, e.g., a smartphone, browses or searches a directory server 500 and discovers aprogram enabling it to buy books online. (For example, the program maybe advertised as preserving user data privacy.) The user devicedownloads and launches the program, perhaps later.

FIG. 11A depicts the situation wherein the user device has selected acomputer program. It issues a request (step 1 a) to the databaseprocessor to establish a session (step 1 b) and causes the selectedprogram's name, Book, to be stored in PL (step 1 c). In step 1 d, thedatabase processor fetches the computer program “Book” from thedirectory. As described above, this causes the database processor tocreate a virtual machine VM100 (step 2) that executes the logic ofprogram “Book” (step 3). The execution results in a list of books beingdisplayed and the user supplying the title of a (selected) book to theprogram (steps 4 a and 4 b). The program also obtains the location ofthe user device from the device's sensor in step 5. (The details of thisacquisition process have been described above.)

Next, in step 6 a, the program asks for encryption keys from the userdevice and, in step 6 b, creates tokens for the data elements “title”and “location”. The tokens are stored in TL. In step 6 c, the programoutputs “Payment” to PL. Program “Book” ends its execution, thus VM100is terminated.

In step 8 a (FIG. 11B), the database processor finds “Payment” in PLand, in step 8 b, fetches the program “Payment” from the directory. Instep 9, it creates a virtual machine VM200. In step 10 a, the programbegins execution and in step 10 b reads tokens “title” and “location”from TL. In step 10 c, it requests decryption keys from the user deviceto decrypt the tokens “title” and “location”. Step 11 leads to theacquisition of payment information from the user and its processing instep 12. In step 13 a, the program fetches decryption keys from the userdevice and in step 13 b creates tokens “Pay” and “Amount” and storesthem in TL. In step 13 c, the program outputs “Shipment” to PL.

The program now terminates execution, causing VM200 to be terminated.

FIG. 11C similarly describes the execution of program “Shipment” invirtual machine VM300 at the conclusion of which no output is providedto PL.

It is important to note step 19 a “Arrange shipping (OOB)” wherein theprogram “Shipment” communicates the address of the user to the shipper.The abbreviation OOB (Out-of-band) stands for a communication that isconsidered to be “special” in the sense that it communicates user datato an external entity.

The database processor flags all communications in which data obtainedfrom a user device is communicated to an external entity. The databaseprocessor may then follow up a flagged (OOB) communication with an alertto the user device. Step 19 b shows the alert to the user devicegenerate by the database processor. That is, the database processorgenerates an alert message to the user device whenever it detects anoutput in the clear relating to a user provided informational element.

Continuing with FIG. 11C, since no output to PL is produced by“Shipment”, the PL list becomes empty. Furthermore, Shipment concludesits execution. Thus, VM300 may be terminated and the monitoring processdoes not find any new matches. Thus, the session may be cleared. In thissense the data elements, i.e., contents of the lists PL and TL areephemeral.

We have thus illustrated that user information provided during theprovisioning of the overall service to the user does not result in anyof his information being retained in the system. This implies, forinstance by referring to FIG. 2, that the linking of user informationfrom different components of an overall service provisioninginfrastructure is not possible in the invention described herein.

Skilled readers will understand that many variations of the abovedecentralization of the user experience are possible in which variousservice providers may provide components of an overall service.

An aspect of note is that the programs run in the database processor invirtual machine environments, write encrypted information into therespective lists in the data store using encryption keys from the userdevice. Thus, no other process can read the data in the lists andconstruct an integrated user profile. Moreover, as the programsterminate, no state information is left in the data store.

It is, of course, possible for a service provider to retain certaininformation acquired because of the user receiving an overall service.For example, the Shipper may record the address to which a shipment wasdelivered. But the name of the consumer is not known to the shipper.

Thus, the use of an out-of-band communicating process may revealfragments of user data to one or more service providers. The presentinvention envisions that such out-of-band communications are highlightedby the database processor to the user. Thus, the user is made aware ofthe possible revelation of fragments of his data to a service provider.

Whereas the above embodiment has assumed that the overall service (e.g.,buying a book online) is effectuated by multiple interacting entities,in other embodiments a single provider may provide all the components ofthe service (for example, by providing all the necessary computerprograms). This does not limit the present invention since the executionof the computer programs uses a system that preserves user data privacyas described above.

In this respect, it is appropriate to mention, and the inventiondescribed herein envisions, the use of block-chain systems to implementservices as smart contracts provided by multiple entities. A smartcontract may be visualized, in abstract terms, as a computer program ofa certain form, operating on data stored in the ledger(s) of theblock-chain system. That is, the ledgers are akin to the data store andthe smart programs are akin to the computer programs described herein.In this sense, the rewriting process that underpins the operation of thedatabase processor may be viewed as providing a component of theoperating system for smart contracts.

Skilled practitioners would have noticed that the exemplary descriptionsof the database processor posit a non-determinism in its operations.That is, the list PL may contain multiple names of programs or a name inPL may match multiple program names in the directory.

The inventions described herein envision overloading the “Output”program instruction described above as follows. We may use the Outputstatement not only to specify names of programs but we may additionalattributes such as names of suppliers and various program attributesthat narrow the searching of the directory.

Other Illustrative Embodiments

While the present exposition has concentrated on theSeller-Shipper-Payment service experience, many other examples ofservice experiences exist that may benefit from the inventions describedherein. For example, autonomous vehicles such as smart cars are expectedto contain many internal sensor devices that will report various kindsof data. The present invention envisions that users of such cars canderive benefits from the techniques described herein wherein sensor datafrom cars trigger computer programs (provided by service providers);such programs may then use the system and methods described herein tooffer services to such cars without imperiling the owner's data privacy.

As another example, user's physical activities may be monitored andanalyzed by smart devices worn by a user or by devices that are near auser, e.g., installed in exercise machines. Activities may then beanalyzed, rated and scored and the data from such analysis may becommunicated to health care providers or insurance providers.

User Data Portability

In traditional telecommunication systems, it is common for consumers toown their telephone numbers. A consumer may retain his phone number whenswitching from one service provider to another. The change wasnecessitated by regulations and is known as local number portability.

It is possible to envision several reasons, including legislative, thatmay require a user to own his data and be able to switch providers,bringing his user data from the old to the new provider. Personalmedical records provide a compelling example. A consumer may have hismedical data stored on his user computing device, or in a privatestorage system accessible to service providers upon presenting requisitecredentials that are only available from the user device. A consumer maythen request medical services that access his medical data by recourseto his user device.

The term social graph is often used in social networking examples. Theterm refers to data comprising a user and his friends and followers. Itmay come to pass that portability of social graphs may be required ormandated. In such situations, a user can switch from one serviceprovider to another, taking his social graph with him, in a sensedescribed below.

Consider the current situation in online networks today whereinconsumers trust certain service providers more than other serviceproviders. For example, many consumers trust Google with their user nameand password credentials. One assumption made by consumers supportingthis behavior may be that Google's services are more secure and lesslikely to be penetrated by malicious parties. The evidence for thisassumption is the facility supported by many service providers thatallow consumers to access their accounts using Google credentials. Thus,a user may use his Google credentials to login into Twitter or Facebook,by way of example.

As a final example, the “winner take all” phenomenon on the Internet isknown to create ever more powerful enterprises that offer many services.It may then be envisioned that they may, either voluntarily or underlegislative requirement, be required to create a (business) unit orentity that handles user data and provides special handling orlegislatively required guarantees. This implies that all the user datamust then be under control of the unit and, hence, may be ported fromone to another service provider.

We now describe how the subject matter described herein may be used tosupport user data portability. This can be accomplished by adding thefollowing additional requirement to the descriptions provided above.

-   -   We extend the condition MC, described above, as follows. In        addition to matching names contained in the list PL with names        of programs in the directory, the user is allowed to state        disqualifying matching criteria regarding one or more service        providers. Thus, for example, the user may be allowed to state        disqualifying criteria, e.g., “no programs from supplier-1 are        to be chosen that match a name on the list PL” that modifies the        condition MC and, hence, the behavior of the database processor.

Returning to the embodiment illustrated by FIGS. 11A, 11B and 11C, themodification to the MC condition may disqualify programs from a certainsupplier to yield successful matches. Thus, the user device neverreceives any services from programs supplied by the disqualifiedprovider.

Similarly, a supplier may be designated as to be selected by the MCcondition.

The various embodiments described herein may offer a variety ofadvantages with respect to computing technology. Some of theseadvantages may include the following:

-   -   1. User computing devices may be freed from running computer        programs, e.g., apps, thus conserving processing resources,        power and so on. This may be particularly important in the case        of mobile user computing devices such as smart phones where it        is important to conserve battery power.    -   2. Apps may not need to be downloaded to user computer devices.        Rather, when a user selects an app from the directory server        (500, cf. FIG. 7), he may be provided an option to have the        selected app injected into the database processor directly,        without the intermediate downloading operation. This frees the        user from managing apps on his user computing device. Thus, the        user's handling and management of his device is simplified. This        also implies that apps on user computing devices need not be        updated periodically, thus saving networking bandwidth and        capacity. Furthermore, app may be recommended to a user who may        then act upon the recommendation without having to download the        app to his device.    -   3. The directory server (FIG. 6) represents a re-architecture of        app store technology. The latter is currently used by many        service providers. By removing the download and updating        functions currently provided by app store technology, we improve        and simplify the technology and operation of app stores.    -   4. By extending the well-known DH algorithm and its look-alikes        to securely handle data communications from multiple sensor        devices via a single user computing device, we extend and        simplify the reach and working of networking protocols to handle        the newly emerging technologies of smart devices (such as        autonomous cars, smart household appliances, etc.) that make        extensive use of such sensor devices. Since DH (and its        look-alikes) are used extensively in the industry, such an        extension will improve the efficiency, operation and cost of        networking protocols.

Certain Illustrative Commercial Embodiments

We provide a few commercial embodiments of the inventions describedherein.

FIG. 12 shows an embodiment wherein a smart device 300, e.g., a smartcar, a household refrigerator, or a smart door lock to a home, etc., isconfigured to provide services to consumers via wired/wirelessconnection 53. (The use of the term “smart” is intended to denotedevices that contain one or more processors which may be configured withexecutable codes.) The smart device may obtain its executable codes fromone or more computer programs 400, the obtaining being pre-provisioned,periodically provisioned, or provisioned on demand. The program 400 mayalso provision a device, key 100, with executable codes. Finally, a userdevice 200 may be provided with executable codes by the program 400.Again, such provisioning may be demand-driven or comprise a periodicout-of-band process.

As a commercial example, the key 100 and user device 200 are needed inconjunction for device 300 to provide services. Thus, a smart car 300may provide programmed services only if the user device 200 and key 100are used in conjunction since, as shown above, data from the key may notbe accessible to the car 300 unless authorized by the user device 200.In this sense, the connections 51 and 52 (FIG. 12) depict the dependenceof device 300 on devices 200 and 100, respectively, to provide itsprogrammed services.

In this sense, the use of the key 100 and the user device 200 may betermed as akin to two-factor authorization of programmed servicesdelivered by device 300 and, furthermore, the service is privacypreserving. The privacy of the data gathered by the key 100 and providedto the device 300 is guaranteed by the inventions described above.

Finally, it is an explicit consequence of the present invention that theassociation between the key 100 and the device 300 is controlled by theuser device 200. That is, a different user device, say 500, mayestablish an association with key 100 and, if successful, invoke theservices of device 300. Thus, it is the user device 200 that controlsthe association between the device 300 and key 100. This allows servicesprovided by device 300 to be ported to different users.

FIGS. 13A and 13B show a different commercial embodiment. FIG. 13Aprovides an abstract view of service disaggregation compelled by theinventions described herein. A service provider, e.g., online seller ofbooks, is engendered by the dictates of the present invention todisaggregate its service offering so that it is provided by more thanone computer program, the more than one computer program interactingbetween themselves, and the user device being one of the interactingcomponents.

That is, whereas FIG. 13A shows service provisioning 400 as a “blackbox” operation, FIG. 13B shows the service 400 being disaggregated intothe components 401, 402 and 403. (The present invention dictates morethan one component.) For example, an online book buying service 400 maybe engendered to be disaggregated into components Book 401, Payment 402and Shipment 403. Furthermore, the interactions between components 401,402 and 403 must necessarily involve the user device 200.

Thus, the user device 200 becomes a component of the serviceprovisioning process and not simply a device that requests and receivesservices. The user device, when acting as a component of serviceprovisioning, provides and controls user data that is needed for serviceprovisioning. In this sense, the user device becomes a control componentof service provisioning.

FIG. 14 shows service portability across service providers wherein auser may port his service from a first provider to a second provider.Such porting is effectuated, as described above, by compelling theservice to be disaggregated and then utilizing the user device to choosecomponents that are not provided by the first service provider. Thisnotion of portability of service is made possible because the userdevice controls the user's data and, hence, may cause the latter to beprovided to selective service providers only.

Privacy Switch

We begin with a summary of some aspects of the invention described aboveand illustrated in FIG. 15A that is a duplicate of FIG. 10. A computingenvironment 200 may be used to run other selected computer programs, theselection being performed by a service provider or a consumer utilizinga user computing device 100. In some embodiments, the selection may beperformed by programmatic means, e.g., by a computer program triggeredby one or more sensor devices. The selected computer programs may obtainuser data from the user computing device. In one aspect, the presentinvention describes methods by which the selected computer programs mayoperate and provide services without compromising the privacy of theuser's data.

FIG. 15B expands on two elements of FIG. 15A, viz., the user computingdevice 100 interacting with the computing environment 200 via connection95. The computing environment is created and managed by a databaseprocessor or virtualized OS. The database processor may be asked tocreate a session object within which one or more virtual machines, VM,may run. An application program may run in a VM; such applicationprograms (or simply, programs) may ask and receive user data from theuser computing device 100 (FIG. 15B) for their computations.

We use the phrases “cause a program to be injected into an environment”or “inject a program into an environment” as abbreviations to denote theoperation by which a computer program, a user computing device, or aservice provider may select and cause an application program to run in aVM in a session created and managed by a database processor or avirtualized OS. For example, a service provider may cause a ride-sharingprogram to be injected or inject a ride-sharing program into anenvironment. FIG. 15B shows an exemplary program CP injected into thecomputing environment 200, interacting with a user computing device 100via connection 95.

The invention described herein shows that a computer program injectedinto an environment may provide a service to a user computing device insuch a manner that at the conclusion of the service, the serviceprovider does not retain any user attribute information provided by theuser computing device. At the same time, the service provider is assuredthat the user data provided to him is verifiable and accurate. In thissense, the services provided by injected programs are said to beprivacy-preserving.

That is, the user computing device and associated computer programsdescribed below operate in a manner that enforces the user's privacyconcerns and the data integrity concerns of the service provider whilstdelivering products and/or services to the user. The invention proposesa system or arrangement as depicted in FIG. 15C, some of whose detailswill be further described in the presentation to follow.

Generally, FIG. 15C depicts the introduction of a logical networkelement, privacy switch 400, into the arrangement of FIG. 15B. In oneembodiment, the privacy switch comprises of two parts, a User PrivacySwitch (UPS) 50 and a Server Privacy Switch (SPS) 300. The privacyswitch may be implemented as a collection of software entities. In oneembodiment, the UPS is implemented as a collection of software programsrunning in the user computing device 100, labeled in FIG. 15D as UPS 50and the SPS 300 is implemented in a standalone server complex, e.g., acloud-based computing environment that, in turn, connects to thecomputing environment 200. In some embodiments, the SPS 300 may beimplemented as a part of the computing environment 200.

The UPS 50 of a privacy switch has two settings, on or enabled and offor disabled, under the control of the user. When set to “on”, the UPSalong with the SPS act in a way to preserve the privacy of the userduring service provisioning as detailed in the following descriptions.When set to “off”, the UPS and SPS become non-functional and the usercomputing device returns to conventional behavior. In the descriptionsthat follow, the UPS setting is assumed to be “on”. Note that a usercomputing device behaving in a conventional manner may not preserve userdata privacy during service provisioning. To avail himself of privacypreserving services, a user may set the UPS to the “on” setting.

In an embodiment of the present invention, the UPS and the SPS executein virtual machines.

In simple terms, we may then say that a privacy switch PS is acombination of UPS and SPS (FIGS. 15C and 15D) that allows a usercomputing device to interact with and receive services from a serviceprovider in a privacy-preserving manner when the UPS is “enabled” or setto the “on” position.

We now further describe and characterize the functions provided and theoperations carried out by the Privacy Switch (in conjunction with thecomputing environment created by the database processor or thevirtualized OS).

We observe that a service provider being represented by a computerprogram, provided with user information, may need to process thereceived user information, the processing extending beyond theoperations of copying and saving received information. We consider a fewsuch possible processing needs and observe that they lead to a furthercategorization of user information as follows.

-   -   1. Alias Information: An example of an alias is the common use        of usernames chosen by consumers. Service providers use        usernames to correlate user provided information with previous        historical usage patterns. Example: A user may provide a        username or alias, such as @john, that was used by him in the        past so that historical transactions may be associated with the        current transaction to determine recommendations.    -   2. Identity Information: A service provider needs to process        identity information provided by the user to authenticate the        user. Example: Biometric information may be used to authenticate        the identity of users.    -   3. Assertions/Preferences based on Personal Attributes or        Historical Data: A service provider needs to verify the accuracy        of information provided by the user. As an example, a user may        assert that his “age is greater than 21” based on a processing        of the user's driver license dataset by a known algorithm. A        user may assert that he likes classical music based on        processing his historical purchase data by a known algorithm.    -   4. Approximate Information: Service provider needs to resolve        information that only approximates a user's actual        information/data. Example: user provides a zip code for his        location, but the service provider needs a street address, e.g.,        to deliver an item to the user.

The privacy switch (400, cf. FIG. 15C) addresses the above identifiedfour needs of service providers whilst assuring privacy concerns ofusers. The details are made clear in the descriptions that follow.References to “user computing device” in the following descriptions areto be interpreted as referring to a user device 100 that incorporatesUPS 50 (cf. FIG. 15C or FIG. 15D).

In one embodiment, the present invention presents methods by which userinformation viz., alias, identity, assertions/preferences andapproximate information, collectively referred to as obfuscated objects,may be presented to a service provider, who may then verify thepresented objects. The verifying process yields concrete benefits to theservice provider and will be referred to as authenticity, resolvabilityand provenance, and will be further described later.

Aliased/Username Information

It is commonplace for service providers to use historical usage data ofa user, indexed by an identifier such as a username, to customize auser's service experience. Thus, many services provide recommendationsand advertisements to users based on such historical data saved fromprevious visits by the user. Keeping a user's identity or otherinformational attributes private from a service provider may negativelyimpact the service provider's capability to personalize the user'sservice experience.

On the other hand, a username is not the only kind of user attributeinformation that may compromise a user's privacy. For example, anidentifier such as a telephone number can be used to contact the userlater. A user's IP address may be utilized to derive a physical locationusing geographical databases that map IP addresses to physicallocations, as taught by prior art.

Therefore, both the user and the service provider have concerns thatneed to be addressed.

In some embodiments, the present invention provides a solution to theabove problem by requiring that 1) user identifiers be known throughnon-interpretable identifiers, and 2) communications between a usercomputing device and an external computing environment be mediated by anentity that obfuscates user identifiers and other user attributeinformation. Since a user may change identifiers at his discretion, anyinterpretation associated with an identifier will be ephemeral. We willsometimes use the term “alias” to denote non-interpretable identifiers.

In one embodiment, the entity obfuscating the communications betweenuser computing devices in a session is a privacy switch acting in aspecific manner described as follows.

FIG. 16 shows the operation of the arrangement by which the SPS 300 actsas an intermediary for communications between the user computing device100 (equivalently, UPS 50) and the exemplary computer program CP 200.That is, CP 200 and UPS 50 are in a session created by a databaseprocessor. UPS 50 sends a request that is received by the SPS 300 andforwarded to CP. In the reverse direction, data from CP is received bySPS 300 and forwarded to UPS 50. In one embodiment, UPS 50 may use thecommonly known approach of “pulling” information from SPS 300.

As will be described later, requests from UPS 50 to the CP 200 (via SPS300) may comprise various types of service requests, includingauthentication, credit card transactions and other user attributeinformation.

We observe that the requirement of obfuscation mentioned above, may beimplemented by requiring SPS 300 to assign an identifier to a requestreceived from UPS 50 before forwarding the latter to CP 200. We describesuch processing by subsystem SPS 300 as follows.

A user device 100 with UPS 50 is invited or “discovers” (in an out ofband process) a service offered by a computer program CP 200. As statedabove, we assume that UPS is enabled. User device 100 (equivalently, UPS50) selects an identifier e.g., “@john”, and sends a request (orinitiates a dialog), that arrives at SPS 300 that, in turn, creates asecond identifier, say “@john123”, and forwards the received request toCP 200, replacing the identifier @john with @john123. Thus, CP 200assumes that the request came from an entity identified as @john123. CP200 receives a request from user computing device/UPS identified as“@john123” whereas, by keeping an association list (@john, @john123),SPS 300 knows the user computing device as being identified as “@john”.

Thus, CP 200 may be in a session with SPS 300 with username “john123”.In actuality, CP 200 is in a session with user computing device 100using the username “@john” since SPS 300 acts as an intermediary orproxy for the user computing device 100.

By maintaining the association list (@john, @john123), SPS 300 maycontinue to act as an intermediary between the user computing device 100and CP 200 for dialogs in future sessions. SPS 300 may save transactiondata related to user computing device 100 using identifier “@john123”and use it in subsequent requests received from user computing device100.

Such operations of assigning identifiers to user computing devices andmaintaining association lists comprising identifiers to preserve userprivacy provide one example of operations performed by SPS 300 of FIG.15D.

The SPS may help the UPS to create another type of association listcomprising credentials and usernames which may then be stored andmanaged by the UPS. In such an embodiment, SPS provisions the UPS withspecific algorithms (detailed later) that are used to generate anassociation list, e.g., (A3, A4), wherein A3 is a cryptographic objectcalled a “credential” and A4 is a username (in the clear) such as“@john123”.

An association list comprising credentials and usernames, e.g., (A3,A4), may then be used in various ways, e.g., it may be used by a usercomputing device to log into a computer program or a website. The lattermay then undertake an operation to “verify” the authenticity of thecredential A3 (details of which process are described later). Uponsuccessful verification, the user device may be authorized to log intothe computer program or website. (In one embodiment, the SPS is used inthe indicated verification operation.)

Thus, in such an embodiment, the UPS creates the association listcomprising credentials and usernames and maintains the association list,whereas in the previous embodiment, the SPS created and maintained theassociation list. Using the associated list comprising credential andusername, a user computing device may directly communicate with aservice providing program, i.e., without using the SPS as anintermediary.

We have thus shown two embodiments. In one embodiment, the usercomputing device communicates with a service providing program via theSPS, the latter creating and maintaining one type of association list .In the other embodiment, the user computing device creates and maintainsa second type of association list with the help of the SPS, but maycommunicate directly with a service providing program without using theSPS as an intermediary.

Identity Information

Most services available to consumers on the Internet/Web require theconsumer to input user identity information. We may categorize identityinformation as being the subset of user information that uniquelyidentifies a user. For example, whereas names or addresses may notuniquely identify a person, social security numbers and fingerprints areunique identifiers. Username/password combinations provide anotherexample of identity information that is unique to a user. Since identityinformation is unique to a user, it merits special attention whenconsidering user privacy.

We propose a method for disclosing identity information that may be usedto provide information to a requesting program by a user computingdevice.

-   -   The user computing device converts identity information into a        representative dataset that is then encoded as a cryptographic        object, called a credential. The credential has the property        that it is opaque to all entities. The credential may be        verified (in a sense described below) by a computational entity        called the verifier. However, the verifier is unable to        re-derive the user's identity information.

Thus, a user's identity information may be converted into a credentialthat may be presented to a computer program. The receiving computerprogram may request a verifying entity to verify the authenticity of thecredential, without knowing any more information about the user. Theverifying entity is able to verify the credential without being able tore-derive user information from the credential.

We present details of the method below.

In current practice, a user may register with a service provider toobtain services. The process of registration may entail the userselecting a username and a password that are used by the serviceprovider to authenticate the user. Since passwords may be hacked bymalicious entities, it may be advisable to consider cryptographiccredentials.

In a current technological trend, biometric information, e.g.,fingerprint data, facial image data, etc., has been used as credentialsto authenticate a user. For example, mobile or smart phones may usefingerprint data from a user to authenticate him to the device or to oneor more service providers. However, users generally do not wish theirbiometric data to be shared with a service provider because of privacyconcerns.

To circumvent this issue, smart phones keep fingerprint data in a localmemory of their processor whose operating system generates a token thatis recognized by participating service providers. Typically, theseservice providers need to have software such as a so-called “app”,resident on the smart phone that accepts the token from (the operatingsystem of) the smart phone and transmits it (or a representation) to theparticipating service provider. Such a method begets a closed system ofservice providers, all participating in the acceptance of a common setof tokens (or representations of such generated by their apps).

In short, a user can authenticate himself to the operating system of hise.g., smart phone, and the smart phone, in turn, provides a token whosevalidity is then accepted by other service providers. Thus, the user ispermitted access to a participating service provider's system due to theservice provider trusting the operating system of the smart phone.

Smart phones and other user computing devices have developed technologythat provides a secure internal storage area for storing user data,e.g., biometric data. Such internal storage areas are only accessible tothe operating system of the smart device and may not be accessible toexternal third party software. We are encouraged by such inventions andutilize them in the present invention as explained below accordingly.

In one aspect, the subject matter described herein allows the trustplaced in a token from an enterprise to be replaced with a method, i.e.,a sequence of steps or actions carried out by one or more (possiblydistributed) computing entities manipulating cryptographic objects. Sucha method can then be verified independently of any service provider,operating system, device or platform.

The verification may thus be carried out in a device and platformindependent manner. Such independence is crucial in its securityimplications. A trust model that relies on a single enterprise isinherently unsafe and susceptible to attack because it is a single pointof failure. In a device and platform independent method distributedamongst many computing entities, different entities may check otherentities and the method may continue to perform its functions even ifsome parts are under attack. For instance, it should be noted that therobustness of Internet transport or routing relies on having multiplepaths between a source and destination (IP) address. As a furtherexample, telecommunications networks often use distributed computingentities to achieve desired levels of reliability. Likewise, datacenters distribute their data in geographically separated entities.

Furthermore, encapsulating user data as credentials that may be securelyverified (without violating user data privacy) frees users from creatingand remembering user names and passwords, a known source of privacyinvasion and security problems in security of computer operations.

FIG. 17A shows a general architecture of one example of an operatingenvironment in which aspects of the disclosed subject matter may bepracticed.

A user having established an account with a service provider using anidentifier, say @john, may be asked to provide a credential that maythen be used to authenticate future visits. Alternatively, the user maypresent a credential and a username together as a pair.

To generate a credential using biometric fingerprint information, a usermay proceed as follows.

In one embodiment, the user computing device contains an integratedfingerprint scanner. The scanner is capable of scanning/capturing auser's fingerprint, converting it into a matrix of data and storing thefingerprint and data matrix for later computational use in the memory ofthe user computing device. In one embodiment, the fingerprint and datamatrix is stored in a secure storage area of the user computing devicethat is accessible only to the operating system or selected applicationsallowed by the operating systems. Modern smart phones represent oneexample of a user computing device with an integrated fingerprintscanner.

A fingerprint scanner is one example of a device that facilitatescapture and use of a user's biometric data. There are other examples ofuser's biometric data, such as retina scans, camera sensors that capturefacial features, voice signature imprint, etc., that may also be usedfor identifying users. The use of the fingerprint biometric data in thepresent invention is purely exemplary and is not intended to limit thepresent invention disclosed herein in any way.

A user's fingerprint (biometric) data may be captured and processed bythe user computing device or transmitted to a server where it may beprocessed by a combination of computational activities performed by theuser computing device and the server. In the subject matter disclosedherein, we assume, without limitation, that the fingerprint data isprocessed by a combination of computational activities occurring in boththe user computing device and server(s).

FIG. 17A shows a user computing device that contains software logic 101,referred to herein as credential creator, that may be used to createcryptographic data objects called credentials. Details of the process bywhich credentials are created are described below. We briefly note thatthe functions performed by the credential creator 101 may be describedas processing input datasets or credentials to produce output datasetsor credentials that may then be presented to one or more serviceproviders.

A service provider may verify a presented credential usingsoftware-based methods described below. In one embodiment, theverification may entail recourse to a third party, a so-called verifier.In a second embodiment, the verifier is integrated into the SPScomponent of the privacy switch (cf. FIG. 15D). We assume the latterembodiment, without limitation.

Turning now to the creation, presentation and verification ofcredentials, we begin with FIG. 17A. An authentication provider is anentity that provides algorithms to user computing devices that may beused to create and present credentials. In one embodiment, the SPScomponent of the privacy switch (cf. FIG. 15D) acts as an authenticationprovider. In FIG. 17A, an authentication provider 2000 containscomponents 201, 202 and 203 that represent software programs capable ofperforming various functions that will be described in more detaillater. These functions are collectively labeled as 200 and are assumedto have access to a distributed storage and database system 300. As willbe shown, the functions labeled 200 participate in the generation ofcredentials that serve to authenticate the user and an encrypted versionof the user's fingerprint data may be stored in the records 375 of thestorage system 300.

In one embodiment, the database system 300 (2000, cf. FIG. 17A) isimplemented as a block-chain ledger system and the functions labeled 200as a set of smart contracts operating on the data in the ledgers.

Assume that an authentication provider wishes to enable user computingdevices to create and present credentials to service providers; thelatter may then make recourse to the authentication provider forverifying the presented credentials. To achieve this purpose, theauthentication provider develops or acquires software programs thatallow him to perform the functions depicted as Key Generator 201, ProofGenerator 202 and Verifier 203 in FIG. 17A. We first describe a generalmethod whereby these functions are performed and then present a moredetailed explanation. The general method is described with reference toFIG. 17B.

Method M1

-   -   In a provisioning step, a user computing device is provisioned        with specific software called Credential Creator 101, FIG. 17A.    -   In step 1 a (FIG. 17B), user computing device selects identifier        @john and requests an authenticating credential for it from an        authentication provider.    -   In step 1 b, the authentication provider runs a software        program, called a key generator 201 (FIG. 17A), on a specific        input, Create Credential Algorithm. The output is a set of        computational objects (called keys), PK1 and VK1. The details of        this software program and properties of the keys are described        below. The authentication provider also runs the key generating        program with a second input, Credential Match Algorithm, which        produces as output a set of two keys called PK2 and VK2.    -   In step 2, authentication provider asks and receives from the        user computing device an encrypted version of fingerprint data        matrix (but not the fingerprint itself). The user computing        device may use the software program Credential Creator 101        received as a result of the provisioning step. Further details        of the functioning of 101 are explained later.    -   In step 3, the authentication provider uses the data matrix        received from the user computing device and a software program        called the Proof Generator 202 (FIG. 17A) to produce two        objects, Proof-1 and Encoded Data-1, collectively called a        credential, credential-1. Optionally, the input to the Proof        Generator 202 may additionally contain other datasets as        discussed later.    -   In step 4, the generated credential, credential-1, and the keys        PK1, VK1 and PK2 are sent to the user computing device. Note        that VK2 is not transmitted; it is saved by the authentication        provider for later use in verifying the credentials.    -   In step 5 a, which may occur when the user computing device        wishes to present the credential, the user computing device        generates a new credential, credential-2, (using software        program credential creator 101, cf. FIG. 17A) and presents it to        a service provider/environment (200, cf. FIG. 15D) who may        request the presented credential to be verified by the        authentication provider (step 6).    -   In step 7 a and 7 b, the authentication provider uses a software        program called the verifier 203 (FIG. 17A) (along with the        previously saved VK2 as input) to verify the presented        credential, credential-2, as authenticating the user and        responds to the service provider/environment accordingly.

FIG. 17C summarizes method M1 wherein we assume, without limitation,that the SPS is used as an authentication provider. Note that theservice provider 200 in FIG. 17C may integrate the authenticationprovider 300 as a sub-component in certain embodiments.

We now proceed to explain the methods by which the various computationalobjects referred to above, viz., keys, proof, credentials, etc., arederived and authenticated in more detail.

We assume the existence of three software engines KGE (Key GeneratingEngine), PGE (Proof Generating Engine) and PVE (Proof Verifying Engine).(The components Key Generator 201, Proof Generator 202 and Verifier 203of the authentication provider shown in FIG. 17A may encapsulate theseengines as computer programs.) As is known in prior art, each of theseengines may be implemented on one or more computers executing specialsoftware logic. A convenient way of describing the functioning of thevarious engines is to treat them as “block box” devices as shown in FIG.18A, 18B, 18C and 18D, respectively. KGE (111, cf. FIG. 18A) accepts asinput a computer program, L, 100. It produces two cryptographic keys, PK300 and VK 400 called the proving key and the verifying key,respectively.

As an example, software logic has been released in the public domain byInternet providers that processes computer programs and produces keyobjects (see, for example, “Snarks for C: verifying program executionssuccinctly and in zero knowledge”, by Eli Ben-Sasson, et al., which isavailable at the websiteeprint(dot)iacr(org)(slash)2013(slash)507(dot)pdf via a secure http,i.e., https, connection.

It is important to note that the keys PK and VK produced by the KGE area function of the input software logic. Any changes to the softwarelogic engenders a different PK and VK to be produced. Furthermore, thecomplementarity of PK and VK is dependent on the input software logic.That is, the output keys uniquely characterize the input algorithm inthe sense that any change whatsoever to the input algorithm necessitateschanges to the output keys.

The term “key or cryptographic key” refers to digital data objects thatsatisfy the following properties.

-   -   (P1) The output keys, if rendered on a display screen may appear        as a random sequence of binary (hexadecimal) digits.    -   (P2) No two distinct input algorithms to the KGE will produce        the same output keys.

PGE (222, FIG. 18B) accepts an encoded object EO 500 (i.e., a datasetproduced as per the descriptions below) and the proving key PK 300(produced by KGE above) and produces a cryptographic object called theproof, P (555) and a new dataset Encoded Object (EO-2 550) that is afunction of the input EO 500. The cryptographic object “P 555” satisfiesthe property P1 above, viz., if displayed, it appears as a randomcollection of (hexadecimal) digits.

PVE (333, FIG. 18C) accepts as input a verifying key, VK (400), producedby the KGE, a proof object P (555) produced by the PGE, and a datasetEO-2 (550) and outputs either “true” or “false”. It produces theresponse “true” if and only if all the following conditions are true;otherwise it produces the response “false”.

-   -   the dataset 550 and proof object P (555) is produced by PGE 222        (cf. FIG. 18B);    -   the key VK is produced by KGE;

It is to be noted that PVE (FIG. 18C) thus may be used to verify thatthe objects “proof” and “encoded data” (FIG. 18B) were produced usingthe algorithm “L” input to KGE (FIG. 18A). If the objects “proof” and“encoded data” are together referred to as a “credential” or “card”, wemay then state that the credential or card is verified to have beenproduced by the given algorithm, L.

We reiterate that the verification of a credential by using theverifying key also ensures that the credential was produced by runningthe engine KGE with a given algorithm. We refer to this feature asverifying the provenance of the credential, i.e., the credential derivesfrom an algorithm that is known and unchanged.

We now show and discuss enabling embodiments of constructing and usingKGE, PGE and PVE.

It is well-known in prior art that a user's fingerprint data whencaptured by fingerprint sensors/scanners may be represented as a matrixof data, typically a 1000×1000 matrix (see, for example, “UsingChebyshev's inequality to determine sample size in Biometric evaluationof fingerprint data” by J. Chu et al., National Institute of Standardsand Technology, Gaithersburg, Md.). For ease of discussion, we limit ourenabling example to a dataset with 9 samples, i.e., a square 3×3 matrixas shown in FIG. 19A. (Similarly, user's facial data may also becaptured as datasets; understandably, facial datasets are larger in sizethan fingerprint datasets.)

The functioning of the engines KGE and PGE may now be explained byrecourse to FIGS. 19A, 19B, 19C, 20A and 20B as follows.

Generating a pair of complementary keys from an input dataset iswell-known in prior art (see, for example, Paar et. al., UnderstandingCryptography, Springer, New York, ISBN: 978-3-642-04100-6; the articleby Eli Ben-Sasson et al. cited above shows how keys may be generatedefficiently); thus, KGE may be constructed accordingly.

Turning now to the enabling embodiment of the PGE, FIG. 19A shows theexemplary dataset for a fingerprint data of a user as a 3×3 matrix. Thecells of the matrix are numbered one through nine using roman numerals(i, ii, etc.); the cell values are shown as integers 37, 42, etc. InFIG. 19B we map each cell value and its position as a pair to one of theintegers 1, 2 or 3 as shown. The pairs represent the cell number and thecell value, thus (i,37) means the sample value 37 in cell “i” of thematrix, etc.

We now construct a 3×3 Sudoku Puzzle (also known as Latin Square) usingthe integers 1, 2 and 3. One such arrangement is shown in FIG. 19C. Asis well-known, Sudoku puzzles satisfy the constraint that the sum ofeach row and column is equal. (In the example shown in FIG. 19C, thecell values of each row and column add up to 6.)

Whereas the Sudoku Puzzle was chosen to be of order (i.e., dimensions)3×3 and the input dataset was also assumed to be a matrix of order 3×3,this is merely coincidental. We may choose a Sudoku Puzzle of any orderas long as its number of cells is larger than or equal to the number ofentries in the mapping table, i.e., FIG. 19B. Note that the order of aSudoku Puzzle is related to its computational intractability. Thus,engineers may wish to determine the order accordingly.

It is to be noted that knowledge of the Sudoku arrangement of FIG. 19Ccannot be used to derive the matrix of FIG. 19A without possessing thedata of FIG. 19B. That is, going from FIG. 19A to FIG. 5C via FIG. 19Bis computationally easy but reversing, i.e., deriving FIG. 19A from FIG.19C—without knowledge of FIG. 19B—is computationally intractable.

(The notions of computational ease and intractability refer to theefficiency of computer operations and are well-known in prior art.)

Thus, the functioning of PGE may be described as a software program(engine) that takes a fingerprint dataset and an algorithm L as input.The algorithm “L” manipulates the input dataset to produce the mapping(such as shown in FIG. 19B) and from it produces a completed/solvedSudoku Puzzle, such as shown in FIG. 19C.

Taking the dataset of FIG. 19C, i.e., the complete/solved Sudoku Puzzle,PGE splits it into two parts shown as FIG. 20A and 20B. Note thatputting the two split pieces, FIGS. 20A and 20B, together to get theoriginal completed table, FIG. 19C, is computationally easy; however,deriving the completed table, FIG. 19C, from FIG. 20A is computationallyhard. For example, it has been estimated that a 9×9 Sudoku puzzle hastens of trillions of possible solutions (6,670,903,752,021,072,936,960).

Thus, PGE may be described as an engine that takes as input an encodeddataset and an algorithm and produces as output (1) an encrypted dataset(“proof component”) representing a partially solved Sudoku Puzzle (FIG.20A), and (2) the “missing” pieces of the Sudoku Puzzle (FIG. 20B,“missing component”), in the clear.

Now we describe an enabling example of PVE with the help of FIG. 21 asfollows.

PVE decrypts the proof component (FIG. 20A), combines it with themissing component (FIG. 20B) that is in the clear, to get a completedtable satisfying Sudoku constraints. If the table is complete andsatisfies the constraints, PVE outputs “true”; else it outputs “false”.

Note, that the computational intractability of the Sudoku Puzzle impliesthat when we split a Sudoku Puzzle into two pieces and distribute themto different entities, we are relying on the fact that any entity thatcomes into possession of one piece of the Puzzle will require enormouscomputational power to “solve” the problem, i.e., compute the missingpiece; whereas, an entity that has the two pieces of the puzzle maycombine them with a relatively small computational effort.

We now apply the above descriptions of KGE, PGE and PVE to more fullydescribe the methods carried out as shown in FIG. 17B, i.e., we presentdetails of the provisioning operation and of steps 1 b, 3, 5 a and 7 a.

The authentication provider encapsulates two algorithms, CreateCredential and Match Credential, into a software package called theCredential Creator, along with logic to utilize the algorithms. In theprovisioning step of FIG. 17B, the package Credential Creator isprovided to the user computing device.

The “create credential algorithm” is a computer algorithm that generatesproving and verifying keys as explained above. The “match credentialalgorithm” is a computer algorithm that matches two (actual)fingerprints and produces a yes/no response. Several Internet serviceproviders, e.g., Amazon, have provided fingerprint data and facial imagedata matching algorithms as open source software.

In step 1 b (cf. FIG. 17B), the authentication provider produces keysPK1 and VK1 with Credential Generating Algorithm as input to the KGE.Next, it produces keys PK2 and VK2 with Match Credential Algorithm asinput to the KGE. These two cases are shown in FIG. 22A.

In step 3 (cf. FIG. 17B), the authentication provider uses PGE togenerate a credential, C1, composed of the proof object and an encodedobject. This is shown in FIG. 22B. The input to the PGE is thefingerprint data matrix derived by the Credential Creator 101 (cf. FIG.17A). In certain embodiments, in an optional operation, additionaldatasets may also be provided as input to the PGE. For example, the usermay provide a name or a phrase that gets encoded into the credential.This feature is reminiscent of two-factor authentication in the sensethat the credential encapsulates two items to authenticate the user, thefingerprint data and the username or phase. Thus, the credentialgeneration and presentation phases will require two items ofinformation.

PGE (FIG. 22B) produces a proof object and a version of the encoded dataas output. The combination of these objects is referred to as a card,C1. It is to be noted that the term “card” simply is a name for thecombination of the indicated computational objects, i.e., the proof andthe encoded dataset. It does not refer to a physical entity. (The terms“credential” and “card” are used synonymously.)

In step 5 a (cf. FIG. 17B), the user computing device uses theCredential Creator software package to execute the process shown in FIG.22C. The process when executed generates a second credential/card, C2.

The process of FIG. 22C may be described as follows. Recall that theuser computing device possesses “C1” and has received VK1 from theauthentication provider (as described in FIG. 17B). We use C1 and VK1 asinput to PVE and verify C1 using PVE. If C1 is verified (i.e., PVEoutputs “yes”), we proceed as follows; otherwise we report failure andterminate the process.

The process of FIG. 22C now asks the user to provide his fingerprint(actual) and user input (if any, e.g., a username). These are fed asinput to the Match Credential Algorithm to check if the providedfingerprint matches the stored fingerprint of the user. A negative matchis reported as failure. Upon positive match, we invoke PGE with inputsPK2 and user data (if any) to generate card C2.

In step 7 a (cf. FIG. 17B), the authentication provider uses PVE and VK2to verify C2 as shown in FIG. 22D.

It is important to observe that whereas C1 encodes the relationshipbetween a fingerprint data matrix and a user specified input, C2 encodesthe two facts:

-   -   1. (1) The verification of C1 establishes the relationship        between the fingerprint data matrix and user input;    -   2. (2) The verification of C2 establishes the relationship        between the user input and the actual fingerprint of the user.

From facts (1) and (2), it follows that the user input data “links” thefingerprint data matrix to the user's actual fingerprint.

The verification of C2 thus establishes that the user who generated C1is the same as the user who generated C2. It is also to be noted thatthere is no disclosure of user identity to the authentication providerand the data objects that it may store, generate or verify. Note, sincethe user input is encoded into the fingerprint data matrix, theauthentication provider is unaware of the user input. All the dataobjects obtained by the authentication provider (as provided by the usercomputing device or the service provider) are cryptographic objects.

Accuracy of Provided Information

The above discussion has shown how a user's fingerprint or otherbiometric data may be used to create credentials by using the enginesKGE and PGE. (The credentials may then be verified by using the enginePVE.) The input to these engines are a pair of algorithms called CreateCredential and the Match Credential Algorithms.

We may use the KGE, PGE and PVE engines to create and verify credentialsfrom datasets relating not only to fingerprints but other biometricdatasets such as facial images. As mentioned above, facial images may beviewed as matrices of pixel data that may be encoded as data matricessuitable for manipulation by algorithms. Just as the Create Credentialand Match Credential Algorithms manipulate fingerprint data matrices, wewould need algorithms that manipulate facial image data matrices. We mayposit two such algorithms and dub them as Create Facial Credential andMatch Facial Credential algorithms.

In certain embodiments, a user may also be allowed to add (as userinput) selected attribute information, e.g., a string of characters suchas “@john”, “likes classical music”, “address=10 Main Street”, etc., byutilizing a suitable API on the user computing device. This is shown asoptional input (99) to PGE in FIG. 22C.

In addition to fingerprint and image datasets, a user's financialinformation (e.g., credit card) or driving license, when treated as adataset, may be used as the input dataset. Note that a typical drivinglicense contains both a user's facial image and user attributes such asstreet address, date of birth, etc. If user attribute information from auser's driver license or credit card are encoded as verifiablecredentials, it will then be possible for a service provider toascertain the accuracy of the user's information.

Thus, for example, a user may be able to present credentials to aservice provider that denote that the user's age is greater than 21,based on the credentials being derived from the user's driver license.That is, a user computing device may be provisioned with suitablesoftware, mimicking the Credential Creator 101 shown in FIG. 17A, toprocess image dataset of a driving license.

More specifically, we may use two algorithms Create DL Credential andMatch DL Credential as input to KGE to derive two sets of keys (PK1,VK1) and (PK2, VK2), respectively, as described above in FIG. 22A. Thatis, the KGE engine is fed the Create DL and Match DL algorithms that aredifferent than the ones shown in FIG. 22A.

Proceeding further with the description, in step 2 a (cf. FIG. 17B), theuser computing device is provisioned with a suitably modified CreateCredential software package (cf. FIG. 17A).

To generate a credential from a driver license dataset, we may now usethe method M1 described above. Note that the only change needed tomethod M1 to process the driver license dataset rather than fingerprintdataset is the use of the different algorithms, viz., the Create DL andMatch DL Credential algorithms.

Note that since a user's driver license contains both an image of thefacial features of the user and his date of birth, the credentialderived from it may serve to authenticate both the user and his age.Similarly, since the driver's license contains the user's streetaddress, the credentials based on the driver license may also verify thestreet address of the user, etc. (The accuracy of additionalinformational attributes added by a user to the input dataset may alsobe established in a similar manner.)

Similarly, a credit card containing a user's fingerprint and/or facialimage data, along with additional informational attributes such asaccount number, etc., may serve as the basis of a cryptographiccredential. Again, this may be achieved by using algorithms thatmanipulate credit card datasets.

We now return to the embodiment described above in which we had assertedearlier that SPS may create and store an association object representinga username. We provide the following description to support thatassertion.

We posit the existence of two algorithms, say Create Username and MatchUsername. The former algorithm operates as follows.

The user is asked to provide or choose a first username. The algorithmgenerates a unique dataset, i.e., a table of data, dependent on theprovided username. That is, the dataset is a function of the input. Thedataset and the first username may be used, as described above, togenerate a first credential/card, C1, that is stored in the SPS.

The Match Username algorithm operates as follows. The user is asked toprovide a second username. The algorithm generates a second datasetrelated to the provided second username. We may now match the first andsecond user names (equivalently, we may match the first and seconddatasets). Upon a successful match, we may generate a secondcredential/card, C2, as described above. Note that C2 will contain acryptographic object and a clear data object, the latter being eitherthe first or second username.

A service provider receiving card, C2, may treat it as an associationobject since it contains a cryptographic object and a clear object. Toverify its authenticity, the service provider may request the same fromSPS (as described above).

Driver licenses, credit cards and other such instruments that containauthenticating and miscellaneous attribute information regardingconsumers may thus be used to create credentials that authenticate andvalidate a user's identity, his informational attributes and theaccuracy of assertions made by a user, by employing algorithms that canprocess the datasets related to these instruments along with the KGE,PGE and PVE engines.

It is to be further noted that the verification of a credential by PVEfurther entails the fact that the input algorithm that generated thecredential, e.g., Create Credential Algorithm of FIG. 22A, etc., wasunchanged, since otherwise the PVE would have failed in itsverification. That is, successful verification by PVE entails theprovenance of the algorithm input to the key generating engine.

Thus, the obfuscated object corresponding to a username, created andmaintained by the UPS as described above, may also be verified, as toits authenticity and provenance, by using the PVE engine.

The various software engines and algorithms used in the credentialgeneration and presentation processes discussed above may be provided byentities that offer instruments such as driver licenses or credit cardsto consumers. In certain embodiments, the verifying function associatedwith the various credentials discussed above may be integrated by andinto such instrument providing entities.

Approximate Objects

In some embodiments, a service provider may need user data to provideservices through an application program injected into an environment,e.g., an application program may be in a session with a user computingdevice and may need the location of the user to provide services to thelatter. We propose that attribute information of a user may berepresented by an approximate object by converting the attribute'ssingular value into a range of values.

That is, we take an attribute's value “v” of data type “t” and derive anapproximate object from it by adding additional elements (v1, v2, etc.)of the same type and chosen by an algorithmic process. As an example,the attribute age with value “21”, i.e., “age=21”, may be converted intothe approximate object “age=(15, 18, 21, 45, 54, . . . )”; theattribute/value “name=john” may be converted into “name=(john, peter,smith, . . . )”, etc. Note that the attribute's value is included in therange.

We require that the range of an approximate object, i.e., itscardinality, be finite and pre-determined.

The notion of approximate objects was introduced in prior art byMcCarthy (cf. J. McCarthy, Approximate Objects and Approximate Theories,Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Proc. of 7 ^(th)International Conf., Colorado, 2000) and by Zadeh (cf. L. Zadeh, FromComputing with Numbers to Computing with Words, IEEE Trans. On Circuitsand Systems, 45(1)105:119, 1999) to capture various kinds of approximateinformation. In McCarthy's formulation, all information is approximate.For example, the statement “John is nearby” may be true in certaindomains and false in others.

As used herein, an approximate object “x=(a1, a2, . . . )” means thatthe attribute “x” has, as its value, one and only one of the elements ofthe set AS=(a1, a2, . . . ). That is, there exists an element “z∈EAS”for which the predicate “x=z” is true and the predicate “x=y” is falsefor every element y≠z of AS.

In McCarthy's treatment, all information is approximate and can bedetermined only by domain specific means, i.e., by a suitable“approximate theory”. In our usage, a user computing device has preciseinformation that is converted into an approximate object. The reverseprocess, by which an approximate object is rendered precise, can only beperformed by the user computing device that created the approximateobject.

That is, a user knows or may utilize his user computing device todetermine the value “z” above. For example, GPS sensors of a usercomputing device may be used to determine the location of the user. Wemay then say that an approximate object in our formulation may beresolved, i.e., rendered precise, by the theory engendered by the usercomputing device.

For example, the attribute/value “near=2 miles” in McCarthy'sformulation may be interpreted as true in some domains (theories) andfalse in others. In our usage, the attribute/value “near=2 miles” may beinterpreted as true/false by a user or a computer program running on auser computing device, possibly utilizing the sensors available to theuser computing device. In simple terms, McCarthy's notion of anapproximate theory (or a domain) needed to resolve an approximate objectis realized by a user computing device along with the sensors availableto it.

The authenticity and provenance of an approximate object may be verifiedusing the methods described above by converting it into a credentialusing algorithms provided by the represented service provider (asdescribed above). Upon receiving such a credential, the service providermay verify it (by recourse to an entity possessing the PVE engine), theverification serving two purposes, viz., that the approximate object wasprovided by the user, i.e., authenticity, and that the algorithmprovided to generate the credential was known and unmodified(provenance).

To show the utility of approximation objects, consider a computerprogram, say RP (Retail Program), injected into a computing environment.Assume RP provides retail locations of a service provider that areclosest to a given location of a user. The following steps areexemplary.

-   -   3. RP queries user computing device, UD, for its location.    -   1. UD provides approximate object, ALO, representing its        location wherein UD is located.    -   2. RP uses the approximation object, ALO, to calculate 3 closest        retail locations, say X, Y and Z.    -   3. RP provides X, Y and Z to UD.    -   4. UD, since it knows its exact location, computes the distance        to each member of the group X, Y and Z and selects the        member/retail location with the least distance from it        accordingly.

The user computing device may now wish to connect with the selectedretail location directly, e.g., it may wish to acquire a route to theselected retail location. To compute such a route, however, we need theexact starting location of the user computing device; the approximateobject is insufficient for this purpose.

That is, we need to resolve the approximate object to its “precise”value. And, by the dictates of the present invention, such a resolutionmust be privacy-preserving. We propose the following method to solve theresolvability problem and exemplify it by returning to the behavior ofprogram RS in the example above, viz., a user wishes to find a routefrom his location to a retail location provided by a program RS.

We assume that the service provider possesses a table, TR, containing alisting of all his retail stores indexed by their location.

Method: Resolvability (M2)

-   -   1. Let the approximate object corresponding to an attribute, L,        be denoted by ALO. Note that the cardinality of ALO is finite        and pre-determined.    -   2. Service provider injects RS into an environment. A session is        established between RS and a user computing device, UD.    -   3. UD initiates dialog with or requests RS for location of        nearest retail store.    -   4. RS asks user computing device, UD, for its location.    -   5. UD responds that it can provide ALO.    -   6. RS asks for ALO of cardinality e.g., 5 (without limitation).        In certain embodiments, the cardinality may be negotiated        between UD and RS.    -   7. UD provides ALO with cardinality 5.    -   8. RS searches table, TR, to determine, e.g., three, retail        stores closest to an area bounded by the ALO elements. RS        communicates the location of these 3 stores to UD.    -   9. RS calculates the nearest store from the list of 3 stores        provided by RS.    -   10. RS invites a route-finding program into the session and        re-directs it to UD.    -   11. UD initiates dialog with route-finding program and conveys        its exact location to it.    -   12. The route-finding program calculates the route and informs        UD.    -   13. UD terminates its interaction/dialog with the route-finding        program and informs RS.    -   14. RS clears all virtual machines in the session.

FIG. 23 shows two exemplary approximate objects representing a user'slocation attribute. The “dots” show the elements of the approximateobject with one of the dots being the exact location of the usercomputing device, and is known only to the user computing device.

We further explain this aspect of the invention in the illustrativeembodiment of the next section.

Illustrative Embodiment (Private Ride Sharing Service)

Having described various categories of user provided information and itsprocessing in a privacy preserving manner as depicted by FIG. 15D, wepresent an illustrative embodiment encompassing the various techniquesdescribed above. That is, we show by the following illustrativeembodiment, the utility of the invention proposed herein and depicted inFIG. 15D.

In the illustrative embodiment below, we consider a service providerthat offers a ride sharing service. More generally, of course, similartechniques may be used to deliver any service or product or to perform atransaction. The elements comprising the ride sharing service may beenumerated as follows.

-   -   1. User requests a ride utilizing the user computing device.    -   2. Service provider causes a ride providing device (e.g.,        automobile or other vehicle) to be sent to the user's location.    -   3. The user is picked up and brought to his destination.    -   4. The user pays for the service using the user computing        device.

Some concerns of the user may be enumerated as follows.

-   -   1. User would like to keep his identity and username private.    -   2. User would like to keep his pickup and destination location        private.    -   3. User would like to keep his credit card/payment data private.

The service provider may also have some concerns, some of which may belisted as follows.

-   -   1. Drivers are provisioned to the user on the basis of being        closest to the location of the user to minimize the “waiting”        time of user.    -   2. Provider would like to authenticate user, i.e., no malicious        users.    -   3. Provider would like to be assured of payment verification.

FIGS. 24A, 24B and 24C show one way of implementing the private ridesharing service (as per the service description above) and addressingthe concerns of the user and the service provider. The implementation isexemplary and is meant to describe one way in which the techniques ofthe present invention may be applied to implement this service.

While this particular embodiment employs three computer programs in asingle session, more generally any suitable number of computer programsmay be employed in a session. Other embodiments may employ more than onesession involving multiple devices, computers and programs.

We assume that the private ride sharing service provider decides to berepresented by a ride sharing computer program RS that matches driversto users who want a ride. The service provider has a computingenvironment that is managed by a database processor, DBP. The latter issuitably configured to create sessions, virtual machines, VM, and runinjected computer programs in the VMs as described in the inventionherein.

The description of the illustrative embodiment proceeds as follows withrespect to FIG. 24A.

A service provider receives location updates from a group of devices,called driver devices (e.g., mobile communication devices that are usedby the drivers) . The location updates received from the driver devicesare stored in a database. The service provider, wishing to offerprivacy-preserving ride sharing services, develops or acquires thecomputer program RS.

In an initialization step, Init-1, a user computing device requests andreceives authentication and credit card credentials, ACr and CCr,respectively, from SPS. The user computing device encapsulates thecredentials into association lists by choosing an appropriate username,e.g., (ACr, @john123) and (CCr, @john123).

In initialization step, Init-2, the service provider initiates acomputing environment managed by the database processor, DBP, andrequests the latter to create a session with a first virtual machine,VM1, in which RS is to be executed. (For ease of understanding, theprogram RS corresponds to the exemplary program CP in FIG. 17C.)

Thus, the session contains a VM, VM1, that runs the computer program RS.We denote this situation as “context is VM1/(RS)” shown in step Init-3.

Note that the service provider may run multiple virtual machines in asession, each of which may run a copy of the RS program to supportmultiple contemporaneous user requests.

In an alternative embodiment, the program RS may be discovered by theuser computing device in a directory and cause it to be injected intothe computing environment.

In yet another embodiment, the injection of the computer program RS intothe computing environment may be caused by a trigger received by acomputer program running on a user computing device, the trigger beingavailable to the user computing device.

It is assumed that RS is pre-provisioned and configured to access the“driver device location update” database.

A user computing device wishing to avail itself of privacy-preservingride sharing services may request the same from the program RS. Such arequest may entail the user computing device to open an account, receivespecific service logic, etc. We refer to such operations collectively asthe “registration” step shown as Init-4.

Once the registration step is complete, RS invites the user computingdevice into the session. We may then denote the context as VM1/(RS, UPS)as shown in step Init-5.

It is important to observe that we are assuming the embodiment describedabove wherein the UPS and RS are in a session and communications betweenthe two are not being intermediated by the SPS.

Step Init-5 concludes the initialization phase. We now proceed with theremaining explanation of the exemplary embodiment.

In step 1, UPS issues a login request to RS using the association list(ACr, @john123). Alternatively, the UPS may respond to a login requestreceived from RS and provide it the ACr and username.

In step 2 a, RS requests SPS that the presented credential be verifiedand receives an affirmation in step 2 b. Note that the service provideris assured that the presented credential is authentic but does not knowany identity information related to the user, other than the identifier,@john123, which it may use with respect to prior historical data. Forexample, the service provider may examine its historical data todetermine that @john123 prefers certain kinds of music to be playedwhile using the ride sharing service or prefers smart cars with certaincapacity. Note, further, that the user utilized the identifier @john toinitiate the request but may change this identifier for future requests.

In step 3, UPS requests a ride from RS.

In step 4, RS requests UPS to provide its location.

In step 5 a, UPS responds with a data object approximating its location(ALO). RS may verify the accuracy of the ALO using the methods describedabove; we consider this step to be optional.

In step 5 b, the program RS calculates and selects the three (withoutlimitation) closest driver devices to RS, based on the location updatesreceived from the driver devices and the ALO object from UPS. Notefurther that RS knows the user as @john123 and has access to historicaldata of @john123 because of the service provider. Thus, its selection ofdriver devices may be influenced by historical data, e.g., it maymodulate its selection of nearby driver devices based on ratingsprovided by @john123 and other users.

In step 6, the locations of the three selected driver devices iscommunicated to UPS by RS. In step 6 b, since UPS knows its own preciselocation, it calculates and selects one of the three driver devices, sayX. That is, the UPS resolves the ALO and selects device “X” based on theresolution. In step 7 a, the UPS communicates its decision to RS.

We continue the above descriptions with respect to FIG. 24B.

In step 7 b, the program RS, having received the decision from UPS thatthe latter has selected driver device “X”, invites device “X” into thesession and requests device “X” to launch a second virtual machine, VM2(step 7 c).

The session context is now VM1/(RS, UPS, X) as shown in step 7 d. The(operating system of) device “X” is running its own virtual machine,VM2.

In step 7 e, RS re-directs UPS to device X.

Note that the notion of a program re-directing future requests toanother program is well-known in prior art. For example, when a websitechanges its address, requests incoming to the old address arere-directed to the new address. Note further that such re-directrequests may be discontinued later.

In step 8 a, UPS communicates its precise location to driver device X toinitiate a pickup request. Note that the user computing device'srevelation of its precise location is made to device “X” and not to RSsince UPS has been re-directed to device X above in step 7 e.

Step 8 b shows the processes by which UPS is the subject of pickup anddrop off processes by driver device, X. We omit details of theseoperations since they are specific to the underlying service providerand subject to user interface and customization.

In step 9, device “X” requests UPS for payment. In step 10, UPS presentsCredit-card Credential, CCr, and the username @john123 to device “X”. Instep 11 a, device “X” requests the SPS to authenticate CCr and in step llb receives an affirmatory indication.

In step 12 a, device “X” records the payment received from UPS as perthe credential CCr using an out-of-band process. Recall that CCr conveysno user information to device “X”. It merely provides an assurance thatthe credential is authentic and that a payment processor may proceedwith processing the payment as coming from an unknown source.

In step 12 b, device “X” sends a request to UPS to terminate the currentdialog. In step 12 c, UPS informs RS that “X” may be cleared from thesession. In step 12 d, RS requests X to clear VM2. In step 13, RSremoves “X” from the session.

We continue the above descriptions with respect to FIG. 24C.

After step 13, the current context is “VM1/(RS, UPS)”. This is indicatedin step 14.

In step 15, program RS informs UPS that the device “X” is no longer inthe session. In step 16, UPS informs the program RS that it is finishedwith its ride sharing request.

In step 17, program RS removes UPS from the session. Note that removingUPS from the session may entail logging out the program UPS.

After step 17, program RS has no other program communicating with it inthe current context VM1(RS) and, as per its design, may be configured toawait a request from a UPS (step 18).

We observe that step 7 b requests driver device “X” to launch a virtualmachine. The purpose of this request is to ensure that X's interactionswith UPS have an additional level of privacy. However, such anadditional level of privacy may be deemed optional in certainembodiments and driver device “X” may not be required to run a virtualmachine, i.e., “X” may interact with UPS without such an interveningsoftware layer.

It is instructive to re-consider step 12 a above wherein the device “X”utilizes an out-of-band method to process a payment from the usercomputing device made with a credit card credential. As has beendiscussed above, the credential is secure and preserves the privacy ofthe user.

However, avid readers may observe that UPS conveys its precise locationto device “X” in step 8 a. Device X also knows where @john123 wasdropped off. That is, the total knowledge of device X about the userafter the above process comprises of the elements:“identifier=@john123”, credential CCr, and the pickup and destinationlocations. The identifier @john123 preserves the user's privacy, as doescredential CCr; however, X's knowledge of the pickup and drop offlocations may be deemed to be problematic about user privacy. We observeas follows.

First, the device “X” knows that it picked up @john123 from a firstlocation and dropped him at a second location, without knowing theidentity of the person.

Second, device “X” acquires user's pickup and drop off locationinformation in a virtual machine, VM2, that is cleared when the deviceis de-registered, i.e., “X's” knowledge is ephemeral.

Thirdly, the device “X” is removed from the session containing RS andUPS.

Finally, once device “X” has been cleared from the session, the UPS isalso cleared from the session. Any information related to the user thatmay remain with RS comprises only obfuscated objects. Thus, the serviceprovider does not retain any user attribute information provided by theconsumer during service provisioning, other than obfuscated identifiersand cryptographic objects that are opaque.

In an alternative embodiment, the program RS, since it runs in a sessioncreated by the DBP, may also be removed. Furthermore, the DBP may beasked to tear down the session itself. The DBP may then initiate a newsession running a new copy of the computer program RS that accepts newride sharing requests. Thus, the service provider may not retain anyuser attribute information.

Illustrative Computing Environment

Aspects of the subject matter described herein may be described in thegeneral context of computer-executable instructions, such as programmodules, being executed by a computer. Generally, program modulesinclude routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, and soforth, which perform particular tasks or implement particular abstractdata types. Aspects of the subject matter described herein may also bepracticed in distributed computing environments where tasks areperformed by remote processing devices that are linked through acommunications network. In a distributed computing environment, programmodules may be located in both local and remote computer storage mediaincluding memory storage devices.

Also, it is noted that some embodiments have been described as a processwhich is depicted as a flow diagram or block diagram. Although each maydescribe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operationscan be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order ofthe operations may be rearranged. A process may have additional stepsnot included in the figure.

The claimed subject matter may be implemented as a method, apparatus, orarticle of manufacture using standard programming and/or engineeringtechniques to produce software, firmware, hardware, or any combinationthereof to control a computer to implement the disclosed subject matter.For instance, the claimed subject matter may be implemented as acomputer-readable storage medium embedded with a computer executableprogram, which encompasses a computer program accessible from anycomputer-readable storage device or storage media. For example, computerreadable storage media can include but are not limited to magneticstorage devices (e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, magnetic strips . . . ),optical disks (e.g., compact disk (CD), digital versatile disk (DVD) . .. ), smart cards, and flash memory devices (e.g., card, stick, key drive. . . ). However, computer readable storage media do not includetransitory forms of storage such as propagating signals, for example. Ofcourse, those skilled in the art will recognize many modifications maybe made to this configuration without departing from the scope or spiritof the claimed subject matter.

Moreover, as used in this application, the terms “component,” “module,”“engine,” “system,” “apparatus,” “interface,” or the like are generallyintended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, acombination of hardware and software, software, or software inexecution. For example, a component may be, but is not limited to being,a process running on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable,a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer. By way ofillustration, both an application running on a controller and thecontroller can be a component. One or more components may reside withina process and/or thread of execution and a component may be localized onone computer and/or distributed between two or more computers.

The foregoing described embodiments depict different componentscontained within, or connected with, different other components. It isto be understood that such depicted architectures are merely exemplary,and that in fact many other architectures can be implemented whichachieve the same functionality. In a conceptual sense, any arrangementof components to achieve the same functionality is effectively“associated” such that the desired functionality is achieved. Hence, anytwo components herein combined to achieve a particular functionality canbe seen as “associated with” each other such that the desiredfunctionality is achieved, irrespective of architectures or intermediarycomponents. Likewise, any two components so associated can also beviewed as being “operably connected”, or “operably coupled”, to eachother to achieve the desired functionality.

1. A method for facilitating delivery of a product and/or service to auser, comprising: causing a first executable computer code to beinserted into a computing environment in which a user session isestablished, the first executable computer code being associated with anentity that provides the product and/or service; establishing a usersession in the computing environment; in response to the firstexecutable computer code being inserted into the user session, creatinga first virtual machine in the user session; executing the firstexecutable computer code in the first virtual machine, wherein executingthe first executable computer code includes obtaining, over acommunications network and from a user computing device of the user, afirst proper subset of all information needed from the user computingdevice that is required to fulfill delivery of the product and/orservice, the first proper subset of all the information being less thana complete set of all the information needed from the user computingdevice that is required to fulfill delivery of the product and/orservice, the first proper subset of the information being processed bythe first executable computer code, the first executable computer codeproducing first output data; selectively enabling or disabling mediationof the information in the first proper subset of information through anentity that obfuscates user information attributes of the user beforethe first information is obtained by the first executable computer code;terminating the first virtual machine upon completion of executing thefirst executable computer code; obtaining a second executable computercode based at least on a first portion of the first output data producedby the first executable computer code; causing the second executablecomputer code to be inserted into the user session established in thecomputing environment; in response to the second executable computercode being inserted into the user session, creating a second virtualmachine in the user session; executing the second executable computercode in the second virtual machine, wherein executing the secondexecutable computer code includes obtaining, over the communicationsnetwork and from the user computing device, a second proper subset ofall the information needed from the user computing device that isrequired to fulfill delivery of the product and/or service, the secondproper subset of all the information being less than the complete set ofall the information needed from the user computing device that isrequired to fulfill delivery of the product and/or service and includinginformation not included in the first proper subset of the information,the second proper subset of the information being processed by thesecond executable computer code, the second executable computer codeproducing second output data; selectively enabling or disablingmediation of the information in the second proper subset of informationthrough the entity that obfuscates user information attributes of theuser before the second information is obtained by the second executablecomputer code; terminating the second virtual machine upon completion ofexecuting the second executable computer code; and based at least inpart on the second output data produced by the second executablecomputer code, causing the product and/or service to be delivered to theuser of the user computing device.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein theuser information attributes include an identity of the user.
 3. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the first and/or second proper subset ofinformation includes an authentication credential associated with theuser, the authentication credential authenticating the user upon beingverified by a verifying entity without disclosing an identity of theuser.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first and/or second propersubset of information includes a cryptographic credential associatedwith the user, the cryptographic credential representing user data thatis authenticated upon being verified by a verifying entity withoutdisclosing the user data.
 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the userdata includes biometric data of the user.
 6. The method of claim 4,wherein the user data includes user preference data of the user.
 7. Themethod of claim 4, wherein the user data includes credit cardinformation of the user.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein selectivelyenabling or disabling mediation of the information in the first andsecond proper subset of information is determined by the user.
 9. Themethod of claim 1, wherein executing the second executable computer codeincludes executing the second executable computer code using at least asecond portion of the first output data produced by the secondexecutable computer code.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the firstportion of the first output data includes an identifier of the secondexecutable computer code.
 11. The method of claim 10, wherein at leastsome of the first output data produced by the first executable computercode is encrypted with an encryption key associated with the usercomputing device, wherein executing the second computing device includesobtaining the encryption key to decrypt the output data encrypted by thefirst executable computer code.
 12. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising terminating the user session after causing the product and/orservice to be delivered to the user of the user computing device. 13.The method of claim 12, further comprising terminating the user sessionin response to user action.
 14. The method of claim 12, furthercomprising terminating the user session in response to action of thecomputing environment.
 15. The method of claim 12, wherein terminatingthe user session includes clearing memory of the user session from thecomputing environment.
 16. The method of claim 1, further comprisingstoring the first and second proper subsets of the information in a datastore included in the user session.
 17. A method for performing atransaction over a communications network, comprising: responsive to auser request received over the communications network, establishing auser session in a computing environment; executing a plurality ofexecutable computer codes that each perform a portion of thetransaction, wherein executing each of the executable computer codesincludes obtaining over a communications network and from a usercomputing device of the user, a different proper subset of allinformation needed from the user computing device that is required tocomplete the transaction, each of the proper subsets of all theinformation being less than a complete set of all the information neededfrom the user computing device that is required to complete thetransaction, each of the executable computer codes processing therespective subset of information that it obtains; selectively enablingor disabling mediation of the information in the different propersubsets of information through an entity that obfuscates userinformation attributes of the user before the information is obtained bythe executable computer codes; wherein information is only exchangedbetween and among the plurality of executable computer codes duringexecution of each of the executable computer codes by obtainingencrypted output information that was previously output from one of theexecutable computer codes, the encrypted output information beingencrypted such that one or more decryption keys are required from theuser in order to decrypt the output information; and after completingexecution of a final one of the executable computer codes necessary tocomplete the transaction, terminating the user session so that each ofthe subsets of information no longer exist in the computing environment.18. The method of claim 17, wherein each of the executable computercodes is executed in a different virtual machine that is terminatedafter execution is completed and prior to executing a subsequent one ofthe executable computer codes.
 19. The method of claim 10, furthercomprising monitoring the plurality of executable computer codes toensure that no individual one of the executable computer code obtainsall of the information needed from the user computing device that isrequired to complete the transaction.
 20. The method of claim 12,further comprising alerting the user if any information provided by theuser is communicated by any of the executable computer codes in theclear to another executable computer code.
 21. A method for a computeremulation system running on one or more processors to facilitatedelivery of a product and/or service to a user by a service providerover a communications network, comprising: initiating a product/servicedelivery process by creating a session; running a first virtual machinein the session, the first virtual machine configured to support only apre-determined set of operations, the first virtual machine running afirst computer program; causing a user computing device to be invitedinto the session with the first computer program; obtaining over thecommunications network obfuscated user data from the user computingdevice that is required in order for the first computer program to causedelivery of the product and/or service to the user; responsive to arequest from the first computer program, causing verification of theuser data included in the obfuscated user data, wherein the verificationis achieved without revealing any of the user data included in theobfuscated user data such that the first computer program is able toprovision delivery of the product and/or service to the user withoutbeing in possession of any information about the user after the productand/or service has been delivered that the first computer program didnot possess before initiation of the delivery provisioning process; andcausing the user computing device to be removed from the session withthe first computer program upon receiving a request from the usercomputing device.
 22. The method of claim 21, wherein the computeremulation system is a virtualized operating system.
 23. The method ofclaim 21, wherein the obfuscated user data to be verified includes adataset representing biometric user data.
 24. The method of claim 23,wherein the verifying of the obfuscated user data is based on thedataset representing the biometric user data.
 25. The method of claim21, wherein the obfuscated user data includes a dataset representingfinancial data of the user.
 26. The method of claim 25, wherein thefinancial data include credit card data.
 27. The method of claim 25,wherein the verifying of the obfuscated user data is based on thedataset representing the financial data.
 28. The method of claim 21,wherein the obfuscated user data to be verified includes user attributedata containing extraneously added data.
 29. The method of claim 28,wherein the verifying of the obfuscated user data includes causing asecond computer program to be executed in a second virtual machine. 30.The method of claim 29, wherein executing the second computer programincludes inviting the second computer program into the session with thefirst computer program.
 31. The method of claim 29, wherein executingthe second computer program includes establishing direct communicationbetween the user computing device and the second computer program. 32.The method of claim 29, wherein the second virtual machine is configuredto only support a pre-determined set of operations.
 33. The method ofclaim 32, wherein the configuring includes causing the second virtualmachine to clear its memory and internal registers upon receiving acommand from the first computer program.
 34. The method of claim 21,wherein the first computer program invites the user computing deviceinto the session based on a request received from the user computingdevice.
 35. The method of claim 34, wherein the request by the usercomputing device is triggered by a computer program running on the usercomputing device and responsive to one or more sensor devices associatedwith the user computing device.
 36. The method of claim 21, wherein thefirst computer program invites the user computing device into thesession based on service logic running in the first computer program.37. The method of claim 21, wherein the verifying of the user datafurther includes verifying that algorithms used in generatingverification credentials used in the verification process remainunchanged.